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THE IMPACT OF THE PACIFICATION ON THE IDEOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT OF UKRAINIAN NATIONAL DEMOCRATS

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Pacification is a set of political undertakings and violent actions carried out by the government of interwar Poland in Galicia and Western Volhynia and presented in response to the so-called sabotage campaign carried out in Western Ukraine in the summer of 1930. Ukrainian political parties and the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists stated that this subversive campaign was a reaction of Western Ukrainian society to new government bills on colonization and settlement in Western Ukraine. At the end of 1929, relations between the Ukrainian minority and the political community, on the one hand, and the Polish government, on the other, deteriorated again as the government's economic and political pressure on the population of Western Ukraine intensified. This provoked a corresponding reaction from the Ukrainian side. The Ukrainian National Democratic Union, as the largest of the legal Ukrainian parties, found itself under a serious political and police challenge, which led to certain ideological and organizational changes in its activities. At the same time, the policy of pacification led to the reformatting of the Union's relations not only with the authorities, but also with other political forces in the western Ukrainian lands.

Key words: Pacification, Ukrainian National Democratic Union, Poland, Western Ukraine, Interwar period, Ukrainian parties, Polish government, nationalis

At the end of 1929, relations between the Ukrainian minority and political environment from one side and the Polish authorities from another deteriorated again, due to the fact that government's pressure on the population of Western Ukraine became higher. The heightened pressure provoked a response from Ukrainian parties. Dmytro Levytsky, prominent national democrat in April 1930 stated due to the last acts of Polish authorities Ukrainians did not expect any concessions from the Polish state and therefore would not stop the struggle for independence, but emphasized that national democrats favor only legal methods¹.

In 1930, a Congress of National Minorities was held in Geneva. The representative of Ukrainian National democrats Vasyl Mudry, the editor of *Dilo*, Ukrainian newspaper, spoke at the congress, saying that the newest policy of Poland's government was unacceptable for Ukrainians in Poland because it envisaged maintaining the status quo as well as violating the rights of Ukrainian minority. The spokesman called this policy harmful and the one that could not resolve any issue in Polish society². Besides, the National Democrats expressed their attitude towards Poland's new colonization

¹ "Українці у stosunku do Rzeczpospolitej," *Dziennik Lwowski*, 23 kwietnia, (1930).

² Державний архів Львівської області (ДАЛО), ф. 1, оп. 29, спр. 443, арк. 87.

projects proving there were attacks on the party by both the Polish authorities and the Polish political forces as well as certain political parties.

Polish government continued the previous policy, ignoring the demands of the Ukrainian National Democratic Union and other political forces and treating them as those who aimed at the collapse of the Polish state. Obviously, the “enemy search syndrome”, which was inherent in all those authorities that were unable to bring the country out of the crisis through reforms worked here. The conflict situation continued as the government demonstrated the intention to represent new colonization projects in parliament and to implement them immediately after the vote. Ukrainian National Democrats protested against the projects on several levels including the parliament where they accused the government of fascism³. However, the pressure from Ukrainian community did not have any serious affect on the government’s decision.

At the beginning of 1930 the government organized the vote for all four new projects concerning the colonization of Ukrainian territories both in Galicia and Volhynia. The central committee of Ukrainian National Democratic Union published special resolution which condemned the adoption and possible implementation of colonization projects. The document was published on the 23rd of March, 1930. the document also characterized the new project as the failure of any ethnic and internal policy of the government and named it there are reason for possible Ukrainian harsh reaction⁴. However, the government did not pay any serious attention to the protest of Ukrainian National Democrats and the projects where declared solid and the implementation started in June, 1930.

The start of this campaign caused a vast protest movement of all parts of Ukrainian society. The protest turned into clashes between the people who came to colonize Ukrainian lands and government forces from one side and Ukrainian peasants, workers, politicians, nationalist forces and students from the other. Polish authorities argued that the clashes, strikes, attacks, sabotage, and the cases of arson demanded special policy to be conducted from the side of Poland government. This policy was named pacification and it was performed with a large number of violations of human rights all over Western Ukrainian territories.

Ukrainian National Democratic Union declared that it did not support the sabotage and arson from the side of Ukrainian peasants and workers. National Democrats proved that their protests where of exclusively peaceful and legal character. Nevertheless the police accused national Democrats of the participation in clashes and anti-state activity⁵. In September 1930 political and police pressure on the representatives of the Ukrainian National Democratic Union started. It had serious impact on on the parties activity and the activity of its members.

³ Державний архів Львівської області (ДАЛО), ф. 1, оп. 29, спр. 826, арк. 15.

⁴ *Ibidem.*

⁵ *Ibidem.*

The government's pacification measures pushed Ukrainian political forces to start the unification of their efforts in protest against the strengthening of ethnic policy in Western Ukrainian territories. Thus, On October 1, 1930, the Ukrainian National Democratic Union, as well as the Ukrainian Socialist Radical Party and the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party, made a common communiqué in which, in addition to protesting against "pacification," they declared themselves different from those Ukrainian forces that committed the sabotage actions⁶. However, "pacification" did not bypass the Ukrainian National Democratic Union, and its attitude to Poland was precisely the reason. On September 22, 1930, police searched the Ukrainian National Democratic Union headquarters, where all the documents had been seized. Later they arrested Dmytro Levytsky, Mykhailo Rudnytsky, Alexander Maritchak, Grygory Gladky, and Vasil Mudry. This was one of the reasons for the mentioned communiqué. In such circumstances, it was almost impossible to run a full election campaign. In addition, arrests of Ukrainian National Democratic Union leaders, pressure from the authorities, and electoral practice prevented the National Democrats from holding successful elections⁷. Therefore, the Ukrainian National Democratic Union lost a third of the seats in the parliament. In the elections, the Social Radicals, Social Democrats and National Democrats acted as a joint bloc, but after the elections they could not create a joint parliamentary club, so Ukrainian National Democratic Union formed a new Ukrainian parliamentary representation exclusively from newly elected members of the association⁸. Although the Ukrainian National Democratic Union condemned the actions of those who propagated and committed acts of violence against Polish authorities, however, the National Democrats accused the Polish authorities and the Polish public of provoking such a policy⁹. Thus the first impact of police actions against Ukrainian National Democratic Union could be observed in the behaviour of the Union during the the election campaign. Ukrainian national Democrats demonstrated that they agree with several attitudes of Polish government and Polish police to the protests of Ukrainians. The communique included the statement which was the rejection of the methods of those Ukrainian parties who took part in the protesting actions. In spite of the condemnation of government and police activities in western Ukrainian territory Ukrainian National Democratic Union had to to withdraw is strong position according to its statements.

The actions of the Polish authorities against Ukrainian National Democratic Union had been partially successful. Under the influence of arrests and attacks, as well as the low efficiency of the association's speeches, the party's attitude to Poland began to change. The communique itself as well as and criticism of the protest against the

⁶ M. Hankiewicz, "Українська декларація," *Dziennik Ludowy*, № 228, (1930).

⁷ А. Айненкель, "Політика Польщі відносно українців у міжвоєнний період. Вибрані проблеми," *Україна-Польща: важкі питання*, (Варшава: 1998), 39.

⁸ "Безглузда злоба чи нікчемність," *Діло*, 23 вересня, (1930).

⁹ О. Зайцев, "Представники українських політичних партій Західної України в парламенті Польщі (1922-1939)," *Український історичний журнал*, №1, (1993):174.

punitive expeditions meant that Ukrainian National Democratic Union deviated from the assertion that from the very beginning of the occupation of Western Ukraine by Poland had pursued a single political line against the Ukrainians, which relied on the economic, cultural, religious and political annihilation of Western Ukrainian independence; from the opinion that the Polish government that is responsible for the attacks on the colonists and other activities by the Ukrainians, who demonstrated a reaction to the intensification of colonization, which again was part of the unified policy course of the Polish authorities. In addition, on November 8, 1930, Dmytro Levytsky had a meeting with the representative of the Ministry of the Interior Affairs, Kazimierz Stamirowsky, at which they discussed ways to overcome the crisis of Polish-Ukrainian relations. This meeting, however, had no impact on Ukrainian National Democratic Union's policy¹⁰. One of the results of this impact was the negative attitude of other Ukrainian political forces to the changes in the opinion of of National Democrats concerning Polish internal policy. For example, Ukrainian nationalists were determined in condemnation of the communique.

Another proof of the change in the course of the National Democrats is a series of publications in *Dilo*, published by Ivan Kedryn-Rudnytsky, who began to act as an editor of the newspaper after the arrest of Vasyl Mudry, which is the other proof that the internal policy of Polish government had its certain consequences. The articles began with a description of the predicament in which the Ukrainian Parliamentary Representation found itself to be decreased and with seven ambassadors in prison. In addition, the distribution of power in parliament changed: the government has received a majority. According to the *Dilo* newspaper, the situation required a change in the tactics of the Ukrainian Parliamentary Representation¹¹. The author of the publications suggested that not everyone could understand this development, so he warned that a change in tactics did not mean a change in ideology¹². According to him, in the political circles of Poland, it was thought that the competition of Ukrainians for their rights, for freedom and independence is harmful to the state. In this regard, the Ukrainian parliamentary representation should work to create an independent Ukraine "behind Zbruch", and the border issue will already be resolved in the negotiations between Warsaw and Kyiv as the capital of independent Ukraine¹³. The Poles should cooperate with the Ukrainians in this line. Such a concept was not new: on the Polish side, it was supported at one time by Tadeusz Golowko¹⁴. The suggestions of national Democrats concerning new attitudes to the internal Polish policy demonstrated a serious impact which was made by the pressure of the government. Thus, such radical changes in

¹⁰ А. Chojnowski, *Koncepcje polityki narodowociowej rondów polskich w latach 1921–1939*, (Wrocław, 1979), 174.

¹¹ "Небувало важке положення," *Діло*, 21 листопад, (1930).

¹² "Плутанина понять," *Діло*, 26 листопада, (1930).

¹³ "Засадничі речі," *Діло*, 28 листопада, (1930).

¹⁴ Т. Piotrkiewicz, *Kwestia Ukraińska w koncepcjach Pilsudczyzny. 1926–1930*. (Warszawa: 1981), 99.

the opinion of the the most popular political party in western Ukraine caused new and vast discussions within Ukrainian community. These discussions determined that whole Ukrainian community within the borders of Polish Second Republic was influenced by the pacification policy and this influence was enhanced by ideological changes among leaders off Ukrainian National Democratic Union.

The ideological background presented in the rubric meant a step towards retreating not only from the decisions of the Third People's Congress, but also from the Ukrainian National Democratic Union's program. The adoption of such tactics in the eyes of the general public meant active cooperation with the Poles or betrayal of the interests of the Galicians, whose fate had to be decided without them¹⁵. Therefore, such ideas were not accepted by the society. The Polish press concluded that the Ukrainian National Democratic Union has weakened, and therefore tries to persuade the Polish authorities by putting national interests in dependence of Poland, or the National Democrats simply wanted to take a misleading step and distract the Polish public.

Left-wing parties strongly criticized the Ukrainian National Democratic Union for betraying the interests of Ukrainian workers, peasants and helping the Polish bourgeoisie to fight the Soviet Union. The Communists said that the Union had sold the Western lands to the Poles for help against Soviet Ukraine and for "organizing a new campaign in Kiev"¹⁶. Moreover, communist organizations, with the submission of their superiors, have published a new theory that the Ukrainian National Democratic Union and the Polish government were trying to form a united front with Western powers in order to overthrow the Soviet Union. The reason for this was a meeting of some National Democrats with German economists, to which Soviet special services drew attention¹⁷. Thus, there was no political Force in Ukrainian society, which would accept the the new suggested course of of both Ukrainian national democratic Union and Ukrainian parliamentary representation. However, it was obvious that the opinion of the leftist was expressed under the influence of their Soviet supervisors. Simultaneously, the opinion off right wing parties was developed within in widespread idea of united Ukrainian independent state.

The pressing of Polish authorities during the pacification policy also influenced other Ukrainian political groups as well as the relationship between them. This influence was performed through the Ukrainian National Democratic Union.

The Union met strong disapproval from the side of Ukrainian parties as well as other organizations including both powers of the edge - communists and nationalists. In spite of publication of official refusing many politicians accused national Democrats of collaboration with Polish authorities¹⁸. However the argument did not changed into open political war and and stayed to be the discussion of concepts.

¹⁵ "Dilo" wznowia program federacyjny," *Lwowski Kurjer Poranny*, 235, (1930).

¹⁶ "Пацифікація про пацифікацію," *Наша Земля*, 1, (1931).

¹⁷ "До історії сеймових виборів 1928 року," *Громадський Голос*, 14, (1928).

¹⁸ Державний архів Львівської області (ДАЛО), ф. 110 оп. № 1, спр.1070, арк. 4-5.

Under such circumstances National Democrats started strong criticism towards the policy of new Polish government of colonel Slavek. Many members of parliament expressed their concerns concerning future internal policy of the government, “Ukrainian political forces are afraid that the internal policy will become more rigid and will result in even deeper confrontation in the relationship of Ukrainian and Polish communities”¹⁹. However the representatives of National Democrats in the parliament still expressed the will to cooperate with the government to avoid further pressing and more violence.

The internal argument within the Union demonstrated that certain amount of the party members did share the ideas of Kedryn-Rudnytsky concerning the larger scale of cooperation with Polish political forces and the government. This situation weakened the organization and could result in the loss of its authority. On the other hand, the government tried to use the readiness to cooperate from the side of some national democrats to push the party to sign the “treaty” that would help the authorities to avoid criticism from the side of the largest and most popular of Ukrainian legal political organizations²⁰. In spite of loud and clear statements that no treaty would be signed by the Ukrainian National Democratic Union in March 1931 it started the series of common seminars to discuss the impact of pacification on the party’s activity and possible ways to end repressions in future. At the same time, the members of the Union did admit that this fact must not be seen as a tendency to collaborate with the state or any Polish political forces²¹. However, the developments at the beginning of 1931 demonstrated quite the opposite.

The reaction of the Union to the violations of human rights during the Pacification policy also included the vast protest on the international level, which was another demonstration of the impact the Pacification had on the activity of the Ukrainian National Democratic Union. In 1931 the Representatives of national democrats encouraged the Ukrainian Parliamentary Representation to fill the a report about the human rights violations performed by Polish police and Armed Forces in September 1930. The report was widely discussed in the League of Nations.

On March 12, 1932, a meeting of the Commission on Political Affairs was convened to discuss the further policy of the party. Lubomyr Makarushka raised the issue of signing a compromise with the Polish authorities and the claim to autonomy. It did not find a response among the party leaders who participated in the creation of the UNDO and in the formation of its political course. They were aware that the adoption of an autonomous resolution would reduce the party’s popularity and cause new attacks on the Union.

¹⁹ “Знову дальше загострення,” *Діло*, 7 грудня, (1930).

²⁰ “Угода”. Вияснення секретаріату УНДО в справі опублікованих польською пресою вісток про “українсько-польську угоду,” *Діло*, 13 березня, (1931).

²¹ Там само.

Makarushka's proposal revealed the fact that in Ukrainian National Democratic Union there is a tendency to move to more loyal positions, which began to manifest itself during the "pacification" under the influence of pressure from the Polish authorities, or under the influence of low effectiveness of Ukrainian National Democratic Union measures. This tendency was most pronounced at the Fourth National Congress of the Union, which took place in Lviv from March 25 to 28, 1932. Some Union's branches opposed the actions of the top leadership, suggesting that the party was not monolithic in its treatment of Poland. Such a situation could lead to the loss of the party's authority, or even to a split, as happened with the Ukrainian National Labour Party in 1923–1924.

Although Ukrainian National Democratic Union did not recognize any cooperation, the suggestion showed that the Union was still trying to change its course, and moved from struggle and demands to negotiations. In other words, the Union's attitude towards Poland has evolved: the party has begun to consider the Polish government not so hostile that it is impossible to reach an agreement with it. This is how the Ukrainian and Polish public perceived the policy of Ukrainian National Democratic Union. The attempts to change tactics have caused dissatisfaction in many Ukrainian communities. During the five years of its existence, Ukrainian National Democratic Union has created a certain image, and the first attempts of the party leadership to change it cost the Union many supporters. In addition, the Polish authorities tried to use this situation to weaken the Union, and/or to accelerate events and push the association to cooperate. The Polish press published articles presenting attempts to sign a Polish-Ukrainian agreement as a fact.

Thus, the impact of Poland's Pacification internal policy on the activity of Unreasonable National Democratic Union was vivid and resulted in deep internal argument as well as the ideological confrontation with other Ukrainian political forces. In addition, the Union obviously changed its development and created ideas of cooperation with the government. Nevertheless, the authorities of Polish state did not manage to encourage Ukrainian National Democrats to sign the peace treaty and the Pacification itself created another essential basis of Ukrainian-Polish confrontation then and in future.

ВПЛИВ ПАЦИФІКАЦІЇ НА ІДЕОЛОГІЧНИЙ РОЗВИТОК УКРАЇНСЬКОГО НАЦІОНАЛЬНО-ДЕМОКРАТИЧНОГО ОБ'ЄДНАННЯ

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Пацифікація – це сукупність політичних дій та силових акцій, здійснених урядом міжвоєнної Польщі на території Галичини та Західної Волині та представлених як відповідь на так звану диверсійну кампанію, що проводилася на західноукраїнських територіях у літні місяці 1930 р.

Українські політичні партії, а також Організація українських націоналістів заявили, що ця диверсійна кампанія була реакцією західноукраїнського суспільства на нові урядові законопроекти про колонізацію та осадництво на західноукраїнських землях. Наприкінці 1929 р. відносини між українською меншиною та політичним середовищем з одного боку та польською владою з іншого знову погіршилися через те, що економічний і політичний тиск уряду на населення Західної України посилювався. Це викликало відповідну реакцію української сторони. Українське національно-демократичне об'єднання, як найбільша із легальних українських партій опинилося під серйозним політичним та поліційним викликом, що призвів до певних змін ідеологічного та організаційного характеру у його діяльності. Водночас політика пацифікації спричинилася до переформатування відносин УНДО не лише із владою, а й з іншими політичними середовищами на західноукраїнських землях.

Ключові слова: пацифікація, Українське національно-патріотичне об'єднання, Польща, Західна Україна, міжвоєнний період, українська партія, польський уряд, національність.

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