

UDC 94:332.2.021(477.7)''1920''  
DOI: 10.24919/2519-058x.17.218193

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**Bibliographic Description of the Article:** Kornovenko, S., Pasichna, Y. (2020). Agrarian Reform of P. Wrangel in the South of Ukraine (1920). *Skhidnoievropeyskyi Istorychnyi Visnyk [East European Historical Bulletin]*, 17, 136–155. doi: 10.24919/2519-058x.17.218193

**AGRARIAN REFORM OF P. WRANGEL IN THE SOUTH OF UKRAINE (1920)**

**Abstract. The purpose of the article** – to reveal that P. Wrangel's agrarian reform was widely understood as a system of measures that influenced the socio-economic situation in the countryside, the socio-political activity of the peasantry. **The research methodology** is based on such principles of historical knowledge as scientificity, historicism, objectivity, system analysis, etc., as well as on the application of general scientific, special historical study methods. **The scientific novelty** consists in the following: it has been justified that P. Wrangel did not limit his agrarian reform by the redistribution of land among peasants. He considered as its cornerstone the intensification of agriculture as an industry, improving the material wealth of peasants, transforming the peasantry into a leading social class. Being aware of the need for quality changes aimed at intensifying agriculture as a sector of the economy, P. Wrangel worked in this direction. In our estimation of efficiency of this work, in our opinion it is necessary to consider the conditions under which it was carried out. Despite the adverse circumstances, P. Wrangel's agrarian reform in southern Ukraine was fruitful. Its conduct, firstly, testifies that the Commander-in-Chief took care of improvement of land management, improvement of agro-technical cultivation of land, provision of peasant farms with agricultural machinery, seed

fund, working cattle, etc. Secondly, the measures taken by the government officials did not seek to exacerbate the authorities' relations with the peasantry. On the contrary, every effort was made to minimize confrontation in the countryside. Thirdly, the agrarian reform was based on the principles of state protectionism of the peasantry. **The Conclusions.** Among the clear achievements of P. Wrangel's agrarian reform there were the following results: 1) the pro-peasant character of agrarian legislation and agrarian reform in general, aimed at preserving livestock, including breeding stock, providing peasant farms with agricultural machinery and equipment, seeds etc.; 2) the complimentary attitude of the peasantry of the South of Ukraine to the activities of the White civil authorities during the sowing, harvesting, normalization of lease relations, intensification of the agrarian sector as an economic sector; 3) during the time of implementation of agrarian reform in the South of Ukraine, 3145 peasants became the real owners of the land, which was confirmed by the relevant legal documents, according to which 66 725 des. of land were secured into a private ownership. None of the governments that took part in the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917 – 1921 achieved this.

**Key words:** Ukrainian revolution, peasant revolution, Southern Ukraine, Ukrainian peasantry, agrarian reform, P. Wrangel.

### **АГРАРНА РЕФОРМА П. ВРАНГЕЛЯ НА ПІВДНІ УКРАЇНИ (1920 р.)**

**Анотація. Мета статті** – розкрити, що аграрна реформа П. Врангелем розумілася широко, як система заходів, що впливали на соціально-економічне становище на селі, суспільно-політичну активність селянства. **Методологія дослідження** ґрунтується на таких принципах історичного пізнання, як науковість, історизм, об'єктивність, системний аналіз тощо, а також на застосуванні загальнонаукових, спеціально-історичних методів. **Наукова новизна** полягає в обґрунтуванні того, що аграрну реформу П. Врангель не обмежував перерозподілом землі між селянами. Її наріжним каменем він вважав інтенсифікацію сільського господарства як галузі, збільшення матеріальних статків селян, перетворення селянства у провідну соціальну верству. П. Врангель, усвідомлюючи необхідність проведення якісних змін, спрямованих на інтенсифікацію сільського господарства як галузі економіки, працював у цьому напрямі. Оцінюючи ефективність цієї роботи, потрібно, на наш погляд, зважати на умови, за яких вона проводилася. Попри несприятливі обставини, аграрна реформа П. Врангеля на Півдні України була результативною. Її проведення, по-перше, засвідчує турботу Головнокомандувача про поліпшення землеустрою, підвищення агротехнічного обробітку землі, забезпечення селянських господарств сільгоспінвентарем, насіннєвим фондом, робочою худобою тощо. По-друге, вжиті урядовцями заходи не спрямовувалися на загострення стосунків влади із селянством. Навпаки робилося все для того, щоб максимально мінімізувати конфронтацію на селі. Потретьє, аграрна реформа ґрунтувалася на засадах державного протекціонізму селянству. **Висновки.** З-поміж однозначних досягнень під час проведення П. Врангелем аграрної реформи були такі результати: 1) проселянський характер аграрного законодавства та аграрної реформи загалом, спрямований на збереження поголів'я худоби, зокрема племінної, забезпечення селянських господарств сільгосптехнікою та реманентом, насіннєвими фондами тощо; 2) компліментарне ставлення селянства Півдня України до заходів органів цивільної влади білих під час посівної, жнив, з унормування орендних відносин, інтенсифікації аграрного сектору як галузі економіки; 3) під час проведення аграрної реформи на Півдні України реальними власниками земель, що підтверджувалося відповідними юридичними документами, стало 3145 селян, за якими закріплювалося у приватну власність 66725 дес. землі. Жоден із урядів, що брали участь в Українській революції 1917 – 1921 рр., не досяг подібного.

**Ключі слова:** Українська революція, селянська революція, Південь України, українське селянство, аграрна реформа, П. Врангель.

**The Problem Statement.** The period of 2017 – 2021 in Ukraine is the jubilee on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917 – 1921. Despite its centuries-old past, the interest of scientists and the public to this phenomenon of a national history does not subside.

**The Analysis of Recent Researches.** The analysis of the historiographical heritage dedicated to the revolutionary topics (Verstiuk, 2003, pp. 5–12; *Revolutsiynyi protses 1917 – 1920 rokiv*, 2014, 62 p.) shows that there is a constant public inquiry into its thorough scientific understanding (Kornovenko & Zemziulina, 2018; Farenii, (2019; Farenii, 2014; Holec, 2011; Bernstein, 2018; Sumpf, 2017).

**The purpose of the article** – to reveal that P. Wrangel’s agrarian reform was widely understood as a system of measures that influenced the socio-economic situation in the countryside, the socio-political activity of the peasantry.

**The Basic Material Statement.** First of all, it concerns the agrarian issue and the ways of its solution, which, given the urgency of this socio-economic and socio-political problem, the peasant character of the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917 – 1921 (Kornovenko, 2014; Kornovenko, 2017) was proposed by all the participants in the revolutionary events of that time. The White Movement of Southern Russia, represented in 1920 by the Russian Army of P. Wrangel, was no exception. Due attention has been paid by the foreign and Ukrainian historical science to the White Movement of the South of Russia, and the agrarian reform of P. Wrangel (Kornovenko, (2008). At the same time, not all aspects of this multifaceted theme have been fully covered. In view of this, it is relevant to study the nature and effectiveness of Wrangel government’s measures to resolve the agrarian issue in the south of Ukraine. The authors of the article aim at investigating the state of land tenure/land use, agro-culture in the South of Ukraine and the changes that occurred in agriculture as a result of Wrangel’s agrarian reform in 1920.

The territory of Southern Ukraine (Berdiansk, Dnieper, Yevpatoria, Melitopol, Perekop, Simferopol, Feodosia, Yalta counties), controlled by the Russian Army, corresponded to the former Tavriya province, amounting to 60 thousand square kilometers, where 3 million of people lived, including refugees and military servicemen. ‘In the north, Alexandrovsk was the extreme point; in the east – Berdiansk and Mariupol; in the north-west – the Dnieper. Arable land was abundant’ (Cherkasov-Georgievskiy, 2004). According to statistics, the middle figure in agriculture of the then Ukraine became a middle-aged man. Already at the beginning of 1919, middle households made up 60 per cent of the total population (*Istoriya grazhdanskoj voyni v SSSR*, 1959, p. 35). The social structure of the peasantry underwent significant changes since 1920, compared to the pre-revolutionary 1916. First of all, it concerns Tavriya province, a region where the percentage of wealthy households had traditionally been high. It is clearly demonstrated in Table 1.

Table 1 (Rybalka,1987)

**Changes in the size of crops in peasant farms in Ukraine**

Years	Groups of holdings by size of crops (%)						
	Seedless	Less than 1 des.	1,1 – 3,0	3,1 – 6,0	6,1 – 9,0	9,1 – 11,0	More than 11 des.
1916	17,3	7,0	17,1	20,4	13,2	25	
1920	10,2	8,5	26,6	27,1	13,1	4,9	9,6

Thus, over 5 years, including 4 years of the revolution and the civil war, the number of idle farms decreased by 7,1 per cent with allotment up to 1 des. – increased by 1,5 per cent; with a share from 3,1 to 6.0 – by 6,7 per cent; with an allotment from 6,1 to 9,0 – by 0,1 per cent; the total number of affluent farms decreased by 10,5 per cent, as well as differentiation

into those who own 9,1 – 11,0 des. land (4,9 per cent) and more than 11 des. – 9,6 per cent. Thus, the poor peasantry made up 18,7 per cent of the total number of peasant households.

In addition, despite the increase in the amount of land in individual peasant farms, in the southern counties of Tavriya province, which had previously been under the command of A. Denikin, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the South of Russia (hereinafter – AFSR), land use and tenure were not secured. There was a lot of unused land that belonged to big savings, thus forming a distributive land fund.

Equally interesting is the statistics on the supply of farms with live and dead inventory, which is an important indicator both to determine the state of the industry and the level of welfare of the peasants. According to the information contained in the agricultural censuses, in 1917 there were 15,4 per cent of the farms in the Ukrainian provinces without cattle, and in 1920 – 7,9 per cent; without working cattle – 44,8 per cent and 34,1 per cent respectively; without cows – 35,1 per cent and 27,2 per cent; without inventory – 43,5 per cent and 24,9 per cent (Rybalka, 1987, p. 40). Thus, during the revolution, the number of farms without cattle decreased by 7,5 per cent, without working cattle – by 10,7 per cent, without cows – by 7,9 per cent, without equipment – by 18,6 per cent. Thus, the peasantry, in particular Tavriya province, levelled off in their wealth, becoming middle-class.

The situation of landlords was another. By no means idealizing their owners, let us note that they were, at least before the revolution, a powerful agricultural complex, having a commercial character and producing goods and for export. In 1920, one mention remained from their former potential. The large landed estates were hit twice. On the one hand, they became the object of the destruction by the Soviet power, which upheld the principles of nationalization, and on the other hand, – by the peasants, who were enriched by landlords' equipment and lands. In addition, the revolution, in particular the peasant one, made serious adjustments not for the better, in terms of hiring and selling labour in the countryside, in rents that could not be normalized.

A striking example of the economic situation of the landlords of Tavriya province is the fate of the estate of Falz-Fein's "Askania-Nova". Of the 400 horses left 1, out of 120 camels – 72, from 1000 oxen – 60, from 300 cows – 3, from 200 pigs – 67, from 45,000 sheep – 5000. Areas of arable land fell sharply: from 4370 des. 415 farms were sown on the farm's farmland. The situation with the acreage in the Karabon's estates (from 2550 inhabitants to 180 persons) and Zheliabin's (from 1945 to 120 inhabitants) was similar. Thus, less than 8 per cent of the farmland was processed (Wrangel, 1992, p. 99).

Considering the state of land tenure and land use in the South of Ukraine, P. Wrangel considered agrarian as the main direction of the government's internal policy in the economic sphere. The Baron was aware that, given the "specificity of ethnographic, economic conditions, amidst general turmoil and crisis", it was not realistic to resolve the agrarian issue in full. He had no doubt that any variant of agrarian reform would surely be the object of criticism. On the other hand, as the content of the memoirs of the general testifies, there was no sense in delaying innovative rural activities (Wrangel, 1992, p. 99). Therefore, the Commander-in-Chief chose the optimal solution, in our opinion, both economically and politically: to cut down the Gordian knot, which became an agrarian issue. Agrarian reform, in his opinion, would improve the economic situation of the peasants, gain their support in the fight against the Bolsheviks, stabilize the food market, thus solving the problem of providing the population and the army with food, feed.

The purpose of the reform, the basic provisions of which were to be elaborated and implemented, was stated by the Baron clearly and concisely: "... to raise, put on the feet of

a labouring but strong peasantry, to organize it, to unite it and to bring it to the protection of order and statehood” (Wrangel, 1992, p. 100). The political future of the white regime was clearly linked to the peasantry and its private land ownership. In particular, he emphasized: “I outlined a number of measures aimed at giving as much land as possible to private property to those, who invest in it. A small peasant-owner owns an agricultural future ... a great tenure outlived its age” (FonDrejer, 1921, p. 106).

The above data show that P. Wrangel’s reasoning about the subject of an agrarian reform had a real economic basis. They were consistent with those processes that took place in the countryside during the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917 – 1921, which, apart from the national democratic one, had a distinct peasant character. In fact, the peasant became the active subject of the that-time history of Ukraine, and the central figure of the countryside of the Ukrainian provinces, including the South, was the middle peasant.

P. Wrangel’s conception of the principles on which agrarian reform should be based was presented in its final form in a letter addressed to the Head of the Civil Administration of the Council under the Commander-in-Chief of the AFSR G. Glinka on March 20, 1920. The content of the document is overflowing with Commander-in-Chief’s concerns of the situation in agriculture – the ‘main activity of the population’. First of all, it is a concern that due to the confusion of the ‘concept of ownership and the concept of actual ownership’ there is a real threat of underachievement. For the same reason, the formation of strong one-man farms is hampered by the intense degradation of landlord farms, which will generally lead to the complete decline of the agricultural sector of the economy.

In this regard, P. Wrangel considered as necessary to take urgent steps to regulate land use/tenure in the South Ukrainian counties. G. Glinka, as the head of the Civil Department, was charged with the immediate creation of the ‘Central Land Commission’ and within a month to develop a plan for an agrarian reform, the procedure for its implementation on the ground through the mediation of county land commissions, which were formed and operated in each county on the same basis as ‘Central Land Commission’. The composition of the latter was co-opted by representatives of the Zemstvo Governments, delegates of peasants, specialists in agrarian issues.

Legislation of the Wrangel agrarian reform was published in the old style on May 25, 1920. This package of documents included the following: “Notices to the Government on Land Issue”, “Land Orders”, “Rules on the Transfer of Orders to the Government, Treasury, State Land Bank and Landowners appointment to the property of the owners who cultivated it”, “Provisional Regulations on Land Institutions” (CSAPOU, f. 57, op. 2, d. 428, 85 p.; Wrangel, 1992).

A government message explained the essence of agrarian reform: land – to the owners who work on it. It was determined by the goal of P. Wrangel’s Government: 1) to protect land management in the form in which it was formed at the time of innovation; 2) transfer to the landowners the agricultural lands, state-owned and privately owned; 3) to create in the countryside proper conditions for economic development and growth of prosperity, so that the peasants do not suffer from encroachment, uncertainty.

It was also said about the mechanism of implementation of agrarian reform: the land was alienated from the former owners, however, behind them land was preserved, the size of which, depending on regional features, was determined by local land institutions, which included peasants. The government only approved their decisions. The report identified the categories of land subject to and not alienable. The latter included: 1) lands acquired



through the Peasant Land Bank, which did not exceed the established rate; 2) cuts and areas allotted for farms; 3) church and parish holdings, estates and high-cultural lands; 4) lands of agricultural research and educational institutions; 5) possessions not exceeding certain sizes.

The alienated lands were secured to those peasants who cultivated them at the time of exit and the law and the message. The size of these lands was determined by local land institutions, but could not be less than the norms set by the Peasant Land Bank. Such distribution was enshrined in an act recognizing indisputable possession. On its basis, documents were issued that finally secured the right to own land for new owners after payment of all its value to the state. The lands, though without immediate delimitation, were transferred to lifelong, hereditary property for redemption, so that they could reach economically sound owners capable of cultivating it (CSAPOU, f. 57, op, 2, d, 428, pp. 75–79).

Wrangel's agrarian legislation corresponded with the then legislation of the Directorate of the UPR and foreign countries. In particular, the positions of protection of the Institute of Private Property in 1920 were and figures of the Directorate of the UPR. Thus, according to N. Kovaleva, the opportunity to regulate the problems of agrarian reform in a new way The Ministry of Land Affairs (hereinafter – the MLA) was granted in spring 1920 (Kovalyova, Kornovenko, Malynovsky, Mykhailiuk & Morozov, 2007, pp. 142–145). The beginning of the Polish-Ukrainian offensive stimulated the development of a new agrarian law. The Council of People's Ministers made an attempt to establish land ownership almost a month after the beginning of the Polish-Ukrainian offensive – on June 3, 1920, promising to start selling state land to individuals in an appeal to the population.

The MLA, awaiting the final decision of the Cabinet of Ministers, proposed to approve the use of private and public lands by the working peasantry and to reorganize the bodies of local land administration. Amendments to the law on January 18, 1919 became the subject of discussion created on May 31, 1921 by a joint commission of land and military ministries. In August this year, the discussion was attended by representatives of Ukrainian soldiers, who were interned in the Polish camps of Kalisz and Wadowice. In Kalisz, two proposals were made: securing small land holdings to private land use and preserving life-long private use only for private plots and houses. In order to eliminate the Bolshevik agitation against the UPR, it was decided to issue a law on additional allotment of a military personnel to land not in emigration but in Ukraine (after approval by Parliament).

The main provisions of Wrangel's agricultural legislation were also consistent with the practice of resolving the agrarian issue in the countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe. For example, on February 25, 1919, the Government of Yugoslavia approved and published the 'Preliminary Decree on the Preparation of Land Reform'. Its principle, as in the legislation of P. Wrangel, was based on the principle of alienation. The parcels of land were relegated to small and landless peasants in norms that could be handled by the peasant family on their own. According to the contents of the document, the land, the size of which exceeded 100 jutars (60 des. – *Authors*) (Imshenetskiy, 1919), were subject to alienation. The Decree of February 20, 1920, supplementing the preceding one, was directed to support agriculture, taking into account the circumstances of the transition period. Behind it, large estates came under the control of the state and, if necessary, the state management (Kachinskiy, 1922, p. 74). In this way, as the contents of the above documents show, the Yugoslav authorities sought, on the one hand, to eliminate the land deficit in peasant land tenure and, on the other hand, – to maintain large, exemplary farms while supporting the development of the agricultural sector of the economy.

In Greece, the law of 27 February 1920 alienated public and private land ownership. The agrarian reform was carried out in the interests of small and medium peasants, who were granted the right to expand the area of their lands through the purchase of additional plots for money. The Greek government, like P. Wrangel, also relied on the peasants, the basic class of statehood. This could be used by both sole owners and peasant associations. For the latter conditions were more favourable. Thus, in particular, individuals paid for the acquired holdings at once, and collective farms were given loans at low interest for a long term (from 3 to 5 years) and instalments in payment. The size of the land being purchased was determined by consumer and labour characteristics (Ter-Pogosyan, 1922, p. 43). The local land councils in Southern Ukraine also took into account the quality of the soil and the level of economic power of the peasantry during the land division, as did the Greek authorities.

The law of the Government of Bulgaria of May 19, 1921 began an agrarian reform, on the basis of which, as in the agrarian reform of P. Wrangel, the principle of alienation of surpluses of large land tenure for a fee was also based. Ex-owners or those who did not specialize in agriculture, there were no more than 40 decares (the size of the city, about 0.5–0.8 des. – *Authors*). Due to this so-called state land fund was formed as a result of non-labour land use, lands of the National Bank and monasteries. From it at the price paid by the state with a surcharge of 20 per cent, the following categories of owners were granted: 1) landless, who worked on foreign land; 2) land with and without inventory; 3) specialists of agriculture, who had no plots; 4) agricultural cooperatives for the construction of model farms; 5) labourers, if, according to the law, 'their personal qualities prove that they can become successful masters'; 6) migrants from the densely populated regions of Bulgaria, in which the low land was particularly acute; 7) the Bulgarian migrants from other countries (Noveysheegrarnoezakonodatelstvo, 1922, pp. 66–95).

Thus, P. Wrangel's agrarian legislation aimed at regulating land use and land tenure in the countryside; the purpose of the general was to endow the peasants with land, to elevate both their material prosperity and the industry as a whole; legislation represented and protected the economic interests of not only the middle-class and wealthy peasants. The protection of state farms and communes by P. Wrangel testified that he also took into account the interests of the poor and needy peasants; the landlords, the former owners, were eliminated from the settlement procedure with the villagers. Moreover, by the special order of the Commander-in-Chief, they were prohibited not only from returning to their estates, but also from holding administrative posts in the county where these estates were located; P. Wrangel's agrarian legislation corresponded to the real state of affairs in the agriculture of Tavriya province, taking into account the interests of virtually all categories of peasantry; it was "flexible", that is, developed and refined, taking into account the socio-economic and socio-political circumstances of the time. Its main provisions were consistent with the principles of solving the agrarian question in the countries of Central-Eastern and Southern Europe. P. Wrangel's agrarian legislation also did not contradict the agrarian innovation models of 1920 Ukrainian national governments, including the Directorate of UPR.

P. Wrangel believed that the peasants themselves had to solve the agrarian question through the authorized bodies created by them. The commander-in-chief, when designing the system of governance, reviewed the role, place and importance of peasant initiative and self-organization. Hair and village structures were understood by them as the pillar of power on the ground, the foundation on which the statehood frame was erected. This position implied that the leading role in the implementation of power initiatives in the political and economic

spheres on the ground would belong to the peasant self-government bodies. That is why the government did not interfere with the peasant initiative to restore the village and townships, the institute of village and village elders. At least, it is not recorded in the sources involved in our research. On the contrary, historical sources indicate that commanders of military units located in the counties of Northern Tavriya received clear instructions from the Commander-in-Chief on how to behave in relations with peasant self-government bodies. For example, the commanders of the civilian units of the army have pledged their full support to the activities of the county elders and village elders and their stairways (SARF, f. 3801, op. 1, d. 2, pp. 24–24 rev). This was also addressed by the content of the Provisional Provision on Land Institutions.

In this way, P. Wrangel and his entourage tried to build a model of 'dialogue' with the peasantry, for which the agrarian question relevant to the latter would be solved precisely through the 'volost and county councils, which would include peasants' (Agrarnaya politika Vrangelya, 1928, p. 61). Governmental authority gave itself a much more modest role and function. As G. Glinka noted in the letter to V. Maklakov, "the governmental authority does not specify or dispose of land in the case of local authorities, but only helps and assists them in this matter, preventing, if necessary, interference with the anti-state element ..." (Wrangel's Agrarian Policy, 1928, p. 66). Thus, the telegram to the head of the Dzhanikoysky district stated: "Give every support to the county land mediator in the gradual opening on the parishes of election districts for the election of county land councils". Similar instructions regarding the election work in Simferopol, Yevpatoria and Perekopsk counties were obtained by Simferopol provincial mediator V. Shleifer (SARF, f. 355, op. 1, d. 5. pp. 81, 83). Soon, having become convinced of the experience in the correctness of their own thoughts, at the end of July 1920 by the order of the Commander-in-Chief, the posts of village commanders were abolished. The authorities thus eliminated the military from influencing the work of self-government bodies in the countryside (RSMA, f. 101, op. 1, d. 174, pp. 41 rev.).

Institutions that assumed legitimate functions to eliminate landlord ownership during Wrangel's agrarian reform were the volost and county land councils, whose decisions were approved by the Provincial Land Council. Land councils were entrusted with an important mission – to carry out preliminary work to determine the conditions for the future distribution of an agricultural land between the owners who worked on them. Therefore, among the primary tasks to which the activities of these bodies were directed, was to determine the location, composition and number of leased land, were not handled by the owners, and were not properly maintained. In addition, it was necessary to find out who, in what sequence, and in what amount, the land was entitled. Therefore, the alpha and omega activities of the county land councils were: 1) accounting for the agricultural land fund to be allocated first; 2) developing and submitting for approval by the county councils positions on the size of allotments assigned to the new own; 3) compiling a list of persons who are offered to take land; 4) land ownership; 5) determination of maximum limits, which remained behind the former owners; 6) estimates of average yield over the last 10 years (SAARC, f. 1668, op. 1, d. 1a, pp. 50 – 51).

The formation of these local land management institutions, which had sufficiently broad powers, was, in our opinion, a significant step forward in involving peasants in state-building. This legally enshrined P. Wrangel's intentions to transform the peasants into an effective force both in carrying out agrarian reform and in general state building.

In most cases, the landlords' large land estates during the Wrangel's agrarian reform were subject to alienation and distribution into private property among peasants who needed



additional holdings. In particular, the Azek estate, located in Tav-Badraksk volost, owned by B. Beckman, was passed by 60 peasants by the decision of the local land council. arable and 91 des. of arable land. In the estate of Molla El the same volost owned by S. Safronov, 403 des. agricultural arable land, 155 des. Pasture (CSAPOU, f. 5, op. 1, d. 322, p. 3). The decision of the Kabariya volost the land council was subject to immediate distribution of the estates of the owners, whose owners did not cultivate them independently. First of all, it concerned the following estates: Tetiy, Biyuk, Kuchuk-Toksaba, Katerynivka (SARF, f. 355, op. 1, d. 5. p. 4).

The landowners' estates were actively distributed in the frontline counties, such as Dnieper. The Novo-Troitskvolost Land Council, in the presence of engineer Rudin, decided to alienate 600 des to Ginsburg estate. and transferring them privately to 18 tenants. The Gromovsk volost Land Council for the Falz-Fein's estate planned to transfer to the tenants 2 thousand tenements, 2 thousand tenants into private ownership. the leased land of the estate of Shiner was privately owned by 85 peasants who worked for it, 320 des. from the Mashkalov's estate – 15 tenants, who cultivated it (*AgramayapolitikaVrangelya*, 1928, p. 87).

A positive socio-political resonance among the peasantry was caused by the distribution of land in Atmanay estate. The decision of the volost land council for 22 peasants was fixed 500 des. land of this savings (SARF, f. 355, op. 1, d. 5, p. 173). The peasants of Katerynoslav province, who came to the Ukluh estuary and the Atmanay for salt, could not believe that the land of the land was being transferred to the peasants' property. Then they were taken to a field where they saw the land surveyors. The latter laid the boundaries of the secured areas (*Agrarnaya politika Vrangelya*, 1928, p. 92). This struck Katerynoslav peasants. They saw with their own eyes that P. Wrangel not only declared, but also implemented the agrarian reform. Against the background of socio-political instability and socio-economic crisis in Soviet Ukraine, the situation in the south of Ukraine was qualitatively different for the better. Katerynoslav peasants could not notice this.

Thus, P. Wrangel not only declared the alienation of land surpluses from large landowners, but also put this idea into practice through the county and county land councils. Landowners remained at least eligible for land cultivation, and most were redistributed for ransom among peasants. According to our estimates, which coincide with the data cited by V. Tsvetkov (Tsvetkov, 2006, p. 370), the land was redistributed more than 20 large landed estates in different ways for the benefit of the peasants. On average, the size of peasant lands, according to information provided by N. Ross, increased to 100 people, and landlords – decreased from 100 to 600 people (Ross, 1982, p. 183). In our opinion, given the historical sources we have worked out, the adjustments made to the land distribution regulations on October 4, 1920, the maximum of landowner land should be limited to 400, and the peasant ranged from 60 to 250.

P. Wrangel considered the basic social layer of the renewed model of the Russian statehood in 1920 as a "healthy working peasantry". This vision of the political future of statehood automatically put the question of its economic foundation on the agenda. Thus, the key to the political revival of statehood was economic recovery. The commander-in-chief noted in this regard: "The main task, the solution of which requires the utmost concentration of efforts, is to restore the destroyed economic life" (CSAPOU, f. 5, op. 1, d. 322, p. 1). The latter was linked to the restoration of agriculture as the "main activity of population" (SARF, f. 355, op. 1, d. 7, p. 172).

The agrarian reform was the mechanism of realization of P. Wrangel's economic plans. In this regard, he did not merely reduce the agrarian reform to regulation of land tenure / land use. She understood it much more broadly – as a component of domestic economic policy.

The components of the agrarian reform were, inter alia, government measures aimed at improving the state of agriculture as a sector of the economy; improvement of agro-culture; establishing mutually beneficial for the peasants and other categories of the population of commodity exchange.

Taking into account the above circumstances, in providing the peasants with industrial goods, the emphasis was placed on the intensification of export-import operations and on the recovery of trade between the city and the countryside. P. Wrangel noted in this regard: "... the scarcity of goods impedes the flow of bread from the countryside. The risk of further sowing is threatened. It is necessary to involve peasant communities in direct involvement in the exchange of grain for imported goods from abroad" (CSAPOU, f. 5, op. 1, d. 322, p. 1).

The actions of the officials were signalled. Thus, thanks to the efforts of General Lukomsky, in addition to fuel and fuel oil, goods from abroad began to flow in large quantities to the Crimea. Cargo transport vessels loaded with industrial goods came to the Crimean ports from France, Romania, the USA and the Far East (SAARC, f. 1765, op. 2, d. 14, pp. 11, 176; SAARC, f. 1765, op. 2, d. 16, p. 2). The former head of the Crimean government in 1919 S. Crim, with the support of M. Margulies, sold 60,000 buckets of wine exported from Crimea to London. On the currency received from its sale, he purchased in England medicines, axes, files, shovels, needles, bags (as it may seem strange, bags, because of the lack of appropriate packaging, were in extreme demand among the peasants, were a very good commodity – *Authors*). All these goods, according to N. Ross, he bought in his own name, because the British authorities banned the export of goods to the Government of the South Russia (Ross, 1982, p. 203). Paris-based branches of the Russian-Asian and Moscow merchant banks organized transportation from France to the white Crimea of military equipment, ammunition, etc. (SAARC, f. 1765, op. 2, d. 14, p. 65). In this way, it was not only declared, but also implemented in practice measures to provide the population, especially the peasantry, with industrial goods. Constantinople became the main trading partner and exported up to 1 million poods of grain only from July 24, to September 16, 1920 (Vyivoz zerna za granitsu, 1920).

An urgent issue in Southern Ukraine's agriculture that needed to be addressed was the problem with the livestock population. The ill-advised requisition policies of the authorities, which often changed one another in Ukraine during the years 1917 – 1920, led to a sharp decline in both livestock in general and tribal in particular. The peasants lost their motivation for organizing the breeding business because they were not convinced that their breeding stock would not be subject to requisition or procurement by certain authorities. Therefore, the owners tried to sell as much as possible breeding cattle, so as not to lose in case of its free removal. This situation had a negative impact not only on the pricing of the food market, but also on the production capacities of the farms. After all, the lack of agricultural machines and agricultural stock in most peasant farms in southern Ukraine was compensated for by the force of horses, oxen, etc.

P. Wrangel has been repeatedly approached by scientists and public organizations for analysis of the current situation in the industry. For example, in Professor Kalugin's, senior animal specialist's report said that "situation with the livestock is catastrophic". The biggest threat was hanging over the cattle population and sheep breeding. According to Professor Kalugin, a number of measures could be taken as a possible way out of the crisis. Firstly, to set up state farms for breeding livestock, completing them at the expense of the remaining herds, including the Livadia. Secondly, the granting of state loans and state support for the supply of forage to farms specializing in breeding stock. Thirdly, the financing by the state structures

of the establishment and operation of a breeding network. Fourthly, the implementation of measures to end the destruction of breeding cattle (SARF, f. 355, op. 1, d. 7, pp. 78–78 rev.).

In our opinion, Professor Kalugin's first three proposals were more in line with peacetime. The latter was real and under the circumstances of 1920. In our opinion, a more constructive approach to solving the problem of keeping the breeding stock of livestock was initiated by the Union of the Crimean Farmers. The idea behind this organization was to brand the breeding stock and prohibit its harvesting or requisitioning. The branding was 'thoroughbred mares and stallions for more than two years, cows and bulls, sows and boars without age restriction' (SARF, f. 355, op. 1, d. 7, pp. 82–82 rev.).

The authorities' concern for breeding livestock was not limited. Its conservation was of particular importance. The reason for such our judgments is at least the fact that Tavriya provincial council was the commander-in-chief of the implementation of measures to improve the situation with breeding stock. In this direction, county councils worked to assist the population in small breeding stock. Thus, the members of Zemstvos carried out the selection of breeding material and its transmission to the herds, instructing the peasants regarding the technologies of fertilization and breeding livestock (SARF, f. 355, op. 1, d. 7, p. 172). At a regular meeting of the Government, P. Wrangel's proposal to establish a State Council for Breeding Horse Breeding at the DALU was approved. The necessary funds were allocated to enable it to function fully. The government's decision banned the Office of Food from cows (CSAPOU, f. 5, op. 1, d. 321, p. 4).

On June 1, 1920, P. Wrangel signed an order in response to public outcry and concern for the preservation of livestock. The district councils, together with the ranks of the DALU and the Military Department, obliged them to carry out inspections and branding of the letters "B.S." ('breeding stock' – *Authors*) of breeding cattle as soon as possible. The branded cattle were not subject to any requisition or purchase for the needs of the army. The requisitioned breeding cattle were returned to the staff of the DALU to keep it 'in special breeding farms' (SARF, f. 355, op. 1, d. 7, p. 85). All Food Commissioners were immediately informed of this order by P. Wrangel. Thus, Assistant Commissioner for Tavriya Province V. Tsybmal received clear instructions on how not to buy from the peasants breeding cattle (SAARC, f. 1666, op. 2, d. 22, p. 11).

The order of the Commander-in-Chief of September 3, 1920 concerning the forced delivery to the population of Perekop, Simferopol, Yevpatoria, Yalta, Feodosia, Sevastopol, and Kerch counties of horses in connection with their acute deficiency in the army, provided that they would not be subject to any special conditions. to each farm. For example, peasant farms with fewer than two horses were exempted from the requisition; producer stallions and "factory uterus", with appropriate certificates from equestrian plants; breeding stallions, "foal mares and uterus with suckers", which belonged to the zemstvos and were kept by them to support breeding horses (SAARC, f. 2235, op. 1, d. 445, pp. 1–2). As the contents of the document attest, the requisitions did not extend to the counties of Northern Tavriya, in which indicators of sowing and arable land significantly outweighed the corresponding data of the Crimea districts.

Thus, there is reason to say that the authorities were doing everything possible, given the conditions of the revolution, to promote the economic potential of the peasant farms of Southern Ukraine and the agricultural sector as a whole, to preserve the breeding stock, and not to leave the peasant farms without traction. In this way the authorities tried at least to hurt the peasants.

Imported manufactured goods were subject to exchange for agricultural products. First of all, their sale was strictly prohibited. All volumes of manufactured goods were only exchanged for grain and livestock products. The price for manufactured goods was determined by a special commission. It consisted of an authorized Food Office (chairman), representatives of the State Control, quartermaster, local cooperatives and rural communities. The market prices for the manufactory were taken as a guideline. Industrial goods were not issued on the basis of equivalent conformity with the quantity and price of the authorized grain product received, but as a paid remuneration. Its size, that is, the percentage of coverage of the value of the grain by the manufactory, was determined by the commission.

In addition to the Agencies of the Food and Trade and Industrial and Trade Agencies, the parish and village heads and the elderly took an active part in the trade. They made known to the peasants how many and what manufactured goods were stored at the bulk points. Also, they had to explain the scheme of commodity exchange: how many and what manufactured goods can be obtained for a given amount of a grain.

The scheme of trade in imported industrial goods for agricultural products was simple. In Yevpatoria county, farmers brought wheat to the bulk points. The mutual agreement of the parties determined its value. 20 – 25 per cent of the total value of the peasant received industrial goods, which were released for 50 per cent of their market price. The rest – 75 – 80 per cent of the value of the imported wheat by the peasant – was paid in money. For example, for 10 pood of wheat with the peasant was calculated so. For 7 1/2 pood he received the money, and for 2 1/2 pounds – 2 pounds of sugar, 7 pieces of soap. For every 888 poods. Wheat peasant received a harvester, the value of which amounted to 277 pood., for 611 – money.

It was almost the same for agricultural societies. In particular, at the request of the chairman of the board of Tukelmes society, the authorized food directorate Mustafa explained the principles on which the company would be able to obtain industrial goods and agricultural machinery. At 20 per cent of the cost of delivery of wheat, at the rate of 500 rubles / pood, sugar and soap were issued at a price 50 per cent lower than the market. The rest – 80 per cent – were paid in cash. Harvesters were only released in exchange for wheat at a price for them in peacetime. For 25 per cent of the delivered lot the wheat could be purchased. For 75 per cent of the delivered batch of wheat, the commissioner paid cash. Conventionally, converting interest into pood, a simple harvester cost 200 poods of wheat, dump truck – 500 pood of wheat and 400 thousand rubles.

The Commissioner for Food of the Yevpatoria County “Bread – Army” harvesters, coal, oil, sugar, kerosene, soap, boots, etc., exchanged peasants for wheat at the rate of 20 per cent by commodities, 80 per cent by cash. For cooperatives the rates were different: 30 per cent with goods, 70 per cent with cash.

Sevastopol leather factory for wheat exchanged soles for shoes, leather shoes. The plant representative exchanged soles at the cooperative at the price of 800 rubles/pood for wheat worth 60 thousand rubles/pood (SAARC, f. 1666, op. 1, d. 18). In Kerch, the quartermaster traded peasants with salt, sugar and kerosene for meat and other agricultural products (CSAPOU, f. 57, op. 2, d. 291, pp. 15–16).

Given the value of industrial and food products, there is reason to say that not all, but most peasants were able to take advantage of the power offered by the authorities. Thus, on the one hand, during World War I and the Revolution, grain exports actually stopped. Therefore, as a rule, it was concentrated on farms and, despite various requisitions, it remained sufficient to meet not only current economic needs, but also for sale or exchange. In addition, the

peasants mostly paid for the 1919 crop, the surpluses of which were serious and exceeded the consumer rate. According to estimates by the Soviet historians, such as Ya. Shafir, 50 million poods could be offered to the market of the peasants of Northern Tavriya in the spring – summer of 1920 wheat and rye, 50 million poods forage (Shafir, 1923, p. 106).

On the other hand, the situation in the countryside was not as simple as it might seem at first glance. Thus, according to the report of the chief of Perekop district, the peasants of this locality had plenty of grain bread in 1919. The Commissioner of the Food Department exchanged it for kerosene, matches, sugar, tea and more. The peasants' harvesters received 200 poods of wheat, ensuring that they pay an extra 1,000 poods for the new crop of 1920 at the rate of 500 rubles / pood. In this connection, the head of the district concluded, 'this deal may be profitable, but inaccessible to the landless peasants' (SARF, f. 355, op. 1, d. 7, p. 118).

In the report of Ya. Rodionov, who from the Food Department for two days harvested agricultural products in twenty villages of the Yevpatoria county, also argues that small-scale peasants cannot take full advantage of commodity exchange. He suggested that P. Wrangel make some adjustments to this procedure (SAARC, f. 1666, op. 1, d. 18, pp. 53–53 rev.).

The authorities made some concessions to the peasants. Firstly, the amount of redemption payments was reduced. Secondly, adjustments were made to pay for the congregation. According to P. Wrangel's order, the amount of payment for rented land could not exceed 1/5 of the real harvest in the current agricultural year. Thirdly, all peasant payments (in kind, money, congregation) were credited to them primarily as payments to the state for land. The authorities made a commitment in the future to settle with large landowners on their own for the land they had alienated (SARF, f. 355, op. 1, d. 4, p. 42). In this way, the conditions were created for the peasants to be able to save grain reserves and thus make fuller use of the commodity exchange.

Therefore, our assertions that P. Wrangel succeeded, in so far as it was possible under the conditions of the revolution, to establish effective trade with the peasantry will be unfounded. Despite all the difficulties of a financial and economic nature, manufactured goods were supplied to the peasants, and grain products – to the cities.

Increasing the areas of peasant holdings, the Commander-in-Chief's concern about growing the acreage, the scarcity of not only industrial goods and stock, but also agricultural machinery on the agenda before P. Wrangel raised the issues of improving agro-culture, intensification of agriculture as a leading Ukrainian economy. Being realists, knowing the information coming from the places, the Commander-in-Chief and his immediate surroundings were well aware that without providing agriculture with the necessary number of agricultural machines, establishing a network of their servicing services, they could count on improving the socio-economic situation of the peasants, intensifying the economics of agriculture. In addition, the welfare of the rest of the South of Ukraine depended on the economic indicators of agriculture.

One of the documents mentioned at the time stated: "The scarcity of agricultural implements of labour and machines, first of all mechanical engines and means of transport (trucks), complicates the transportation of bread in exchange for the necessary industrial goods for the peasants, does not create favourable conditions for the development of single peasants. All this significantly reduces the interest of farmers to expand acreage and own farm in general" (SARF, f. 355, op. 1, d. 18, p. 6).

The real state of affairs with the provision of peasant farms in southern Ukraine was this. Our simple mathematical calculations of statistics show that in the last pre-war year (1913) peasants on two farms accounted for one arable crop and one cultivator (an average



of 20 people), one seeder for twenty farms (an average of 200 des.), fifteen reapers per hundred farms (an average of 1,000 ten), one horse rake per hundred farms (an average of 1,000 ten), one thresher for fifty farms (an average of 500 ten), thirty-seven fans per ten farms (an average of 100 des.). Compared to similar indicators in other provinces, the peasants of Tavria in 1916 occupied 4–5 places in terms of availability of agricultural machinery and equipment” (SARF, f. 355, op. 1, d. 7, p. 174).

In 1920, the peasants of southern Ukraine had one arable crop and one cartridge (an average of 13.1 persons), seven seeders per hundred farms (an average of 1310 farms), and four harvesters per ten farms (in one farm). an average of 131 people), six threshers per one hundred farms (an average of 1,310 people), five fans for ten farms (an average of 131 people), one forge could serve the needs of repairing agricultural machinery of five farms (SARF, f. 355, op. 1, d. 7, p. 174).

During World War I and Revolution years, the average size of peasant farms in southern Ukraine increased from 9,9 per cent. in 1916 to 13,2 des. in 1920; the number of farms decreased by 38,880 farms (these data are very relative, given that information is not available on all counties of southern Ukraine – *Authors*); at 810,562 units there was a decrease in the fans. Positive shifts are observed in the remaining positions: by 81,018 units the number of field implements has increased; on 37129 – harvester; on 6739 – threshers; on 855 – sowing machines (SARF, f. 355, op. 1, d. 7, p. 174; SARF, f. 355, op. 1, d. 24, p. 4 rev.).

In our opinion, it is advisable to refer to the analysis of indicators for the technical support of one or more peasant farms during 1916 – 1920. Given the data on this, we note that in 1916 1 arable field was 20 times, in 1920 – by 13.3 des.; in 1916, 1 planter served 200 units, in 1920 – 187 units; in 1916 1 reaper – 66 des., in 1920 – 33 des.; in 1916 1 thresher – 500 des., in 1920 – 218 des.; in 1916 1 fan – 2,7 des, in 1920 – 26,2 des (SARF, f. 355, op. 1, d. 7, p. 174; SARF, f. 355, op. 1, d. 24, p. 4 rev). Consequently, changes to the better provision of agricultural farms and machinery for the peasant farms were minimal in 1916 – 1920. Moreover, a considerable number of them needed repair or renewal. The presence of agricultural machinery on the farm did not always mean its effective use. Factors such as lack of weight, dominance of the female and adolescent labour force in the absence of men, etc., were an obstacle to this.

Equally important was the way agricultural machinery was distributed between the counties, taking into account the availability of acreage in each of them, the number of peasant farms, etc. Careful analysis of statistics gives sufficient reason to speak about the security of each county in a particular type of agricultural machinery and stock (SARF, f. 355, op. 1, d. 7, p. 174). At the same time, we can draw a fair picture of the shortage of agricultural machinery and agricultural stock in the peasant farms of southern Ukraine (except for the Yalta county, whose population did not specialize in arable land). According to our calculations, the peasant farms of Perekop, Yevpatoria, Berdiansk, and Melitopol counties were provided with the tools of agriculture. In the remaining counties, two to four farms out of ten were unsecured. Agricultural machinery was lacking in every farm (SARF, f. 355, op. 1, d. 7, p. 174).

It was also obvious that it would be difficult to saturate the farms with the necessary labour tools only through imports. Firstly, they were expensive for the peasants, though not for everyone, as we wrote above. Secondly, agricultural machinery was difficult to transport from the ports in the parish in the absence of a well-established transportation system. Thirdly, in addition to the equipment itself, the authorities had to buy overseas and spare parts for it. This required additional costs. Fourthly, the demand for expensive agricultural

machinery among the peasants was low, and therefore the treasury could not count on the rapid replenishment of the state stocks of bread consumed during export-import operations. In addition, despite significant bread reserves in the peasant farms of southern Ukraine, they were also not unlimited.

In adequately responding to the needs of agriculture in agricultural machinery and equipment, P. Wrangel developed and implemented a number of measures to improve the situation in the agricultural sector of the economy. Thus, in parallel with the continuation of export-import operations, an emphasis was also placed on the accumulation of domestic resources. The government involved the state structures, zemstvos and other public associations and organizations in the implementation of a purposeful programme of supplying farmers with the necessary agricultural machines. In addition, efforts were made to increase the production capacity of domestic agricultural enterprises.

A large-scale action programme was developed to address the goal of intensifying agriculture in southern Ukraine. Its content was reduced to the following provisions. Firstly, setting up of service and repair of agricultural machines, mechanisms, stock. Secondly, the rational use of existing spare parts reserves, old foreign orders. Thirdly, correct and even distribution of agricultural machinery and tools among the population. Fourthly, restoration of activity of domestic factories and agricultural workshops and strengthening of production capacities of those enterprises that were still operating (SARF, f. 355, op. 1, d. 24, p. 56).

The Department of Agriculture and Land Use (hereinafter referred to as DALU) was entrusted with specific work on the organization of repair of agricultural machinery and tools. To do this, the employees of the Office involved agricultural workshops, forges remaining in the estates under the administration of this department, and eight factories located in Simferopol, Dzhankey, Old Crimea, Yevpatoria and Berdiansk (SARF, f. 355, op. 1, d. 7, p. 175 rev.). In addition to the above, the activity of two state-owned agricultural machinery manufacturing plants near Big Tikman, one sequestered plant in Big Tikman, was resumed. DALU launched a machine-building station in Akamovka with a large tractor station and a large repair shop (SARF, f. 355, op. 1, d. 24, p. 57).

The DALU proclaimed itself a monopoly-owner of the property of 'Technical Consultation' – a state structure, which at the Special meeting provided the agriculture with the necessary machinery, equipment, spare parts for them. The size of this property was serious, its rational use would, as expected, significantly reduce the shortage of agricultural implements. Thus, according to the certificate of Technical Consultation, submitted on February 29, 1920 to the authorized DALU, one of the warehouses of this structure focused the following amount of equipment: only separators with a capacity of 42 buckets per hour – 3000 pieces, Clayton locomobiles with threshers to them – 4 pieces, Becker fans – 8 pieces, rivets for mowers – 2170 ood., Turner machines for the production of spare parts – 10 pieces, Robison machines – 7 amount, Penney fans – 8 amount, Becker fans – 4 amount, different types straw cutter – 392 pcs. Garret locomobiles of different power – 33 amount, Garrett hammers different power – 17 pcs., 11 names of spare parts to them (SARF, f. 355, op. 1, d. 7, pp. 51–51 rev.).

The property of the 'Selhoz' was transferred to the ownership of the DALU, which also kept a large part of the agricultural implements necessary for the agrarian sector of the economy and their spare parts. The Agricultural Department also distributed agricultural machines purchased abroad. The Department of Trade and Industry also transferred imported industrial products to the balance of the Department of Agriculture (SARF, f. 355, op. 1, d. 24, pp. 57–57 rev.). G. Glinka's office also received the prerogative of securing applications for such

goods, such as coal, iron, fuel and lubricants, for the factories and workshops required for the manufacture and repair of agricultural machinery. In this way, the government delegated to the state structure all powers regarding the distribution of agricultural tools and labour.

The district zemstvos were actively involved in the implementation of the P. Wrangel programme on the intensification of the agrarian sector of the economy. Tavriya Provincial Zemstvo Authority received from the Commander-in-Chief clear instructions regarding the powers of Zemstvo officials and the directions of work of the district zemstvos during the implementation of the above measures in the village. In particular, zemstvos warehouses were co-opted into a common system of repositories, to which DALU centrally distributed imported and domestic agricultural equipment. Entrepreneurship was entrusted with the organization and real holding on the ground, with wide involvement of 'cooperative organizations, representatives of the agricultural factory industry', county zemstvos, the following types of works: 1) uniform distribution of agricultural inventory between peasant farms of counties and parishes; 2) rational use of stocks of consumables stored in warehouses; 3) repair and production of simple types of agricultural machines and tools; 4) expanding the network of agricultural machinery land points to enable as many peasants to benefit from them. To implement these measures, Tavriya provincial zemstvo received a loan of 50 million rubles (SARF, f. 355, op. 1, d. 7, p. 178).

The figures of Tavriya provincial zemstvos were also granted a number of powers, which made their activities real and productive. Zemstvos were able to raise all available reserves for repair and production of agricultural implements. They had the right to involve governmental, private enterprises in the execution of land orders for the manufacture of agricultural implements. Zemsky agents were given the 'power and authority of persons carrying out a matter of special state importance'. Not only did they issue orders, but they also directly supervised their implementation on the ground, eliminating the difficulties encountered during this. Zemstvos enjoyed the right of extraordinary (except military) transportation of goods by any means of transport. Such transportations, as well as their contents, were protected by the authorities against requisitions and other unforeseen circumstances. Social benefits and social guarantees were provided by the authorities at the request of zemstvos to the workers, their families involved in agricultural enterprises and workshops. Tax preferences were given to small and medium-sized enterprises that performed orders for zemstvos for the production of agricultural implements or their repair (SARF, f. 355, op. 1, d. 7, pp. 184–185 rev.).

Therefore, summarizing the above, we note that P. Wrangel prioritized agriculture in the agricultural policy. A purposeful program for providing the farms with the necessary agricultural machinery and equipment was developed and put into practice. To solve the problem of technical equipment of the agrarian sector of the economy of Southern Ukraine, maximum opportunities, financial and human resources were involved. The satisfaction of the needs of single peasant farms in machinery and repair was achieved through commodity exchange, export-import operations, mobilization of domestic resources. All efforts by the authorities have focused on improving agricultural productivity as an economic sector, with particular emphasis on providing it with the necessary agricultural machinery and mechanisms. On the basis of disparate and circumstantial evidence, it can be assumed that the peasants' demand for agricultural machinery and P. Wrangel's government's supply were partially met.

The materials we have worked out capture a wide range of peasant sentiment regarding P. Wrangel's agrarian reform. At the same time, one should take into account the peculiarities of the psychology of the peasants. In addition, it should be borne in mind that the attitude of

peasants to the land order and other supporting documents to a greater extent manifested their position to the individual representatives of the authorities, to the duration of its stay, to the socio-economic situation in 1920, rather than to the most legal and regulatory situation bases.

In most of the historical sources involved in our research we have found a complementary attitude of peasants to the agrarian laws of Wrangel government. “The attitude of the population to us is positive ... The peasants are actively interested in literature. Life here is several times cheaper than the Crimean one”, – one of the lecturers who returned from a trip to the villages of Northern Tavriya shared his impressions with the correspondent of the Voice of Tavriya (*V mestnostyah, zanyatyih name*, 1920). According to the newspaper “South of Russia”, “the population is interested in the new law on land, treats it with understanding” (SARF, f. 355, op. 1, d. 20, p. 5 rev.).

The note, in the fields written by the author ‘about Wrangel’s law’, stated the state of affairs in Tavriya districts, which had just been conquered by the Russian Army in the Red. Among other things, it was about the attitude of the population of these areas to the agrarian legislation of the P. Wrangel government. ‘There is no need for any state intervention’, the condolence with which the population meets the law of the land, especially in Tavriya counties, which had gone through all the horrors of the Bolshevik slavery and deceit in its promises, the document ran. According to the impressions of Melitopol county land mediator, who arrived in the district on September 11, 1920 for land surveying, ‘the population received positive news about the land’ (SARF, f. 355, op. 1, d. 18, pp. 13–15).

The situation was similar in Perekop district. Campaign lecturers, who repeatedly visited the townships of the county, informed that the peasants showed an active interest, a ‘sympathetic’ attitude to the land law. They came to this conclusion on the basis that during the conversations with the peasants, the latter asked many questions. First of all, they were interested in practical aspects of the implementation of the agrarian reform (SARF, f. 355, op. 1, d. 3a, pp. 9–9 rev.). Despite the fact that there were no lands in Yalta district subject to alienation, the peasants of Baidar, Alushtin and Bogatyr districts showed keen interest in the agrarian legislation of May 25, 1920. They even raised petitions before the county council for organizing elections (SARF, f. 355, op. 1, d. 20, p. 32 rev.).

At the same time, in the counties in which the fighting had been taking place until recently, the peasants’ attitude to the agrarian legislation of P. Wrangel was restrained and neutral. This was at least reported by DALU employees in their information sheets. Thus, employees of this department, being in the northern parishes of Melitopol, Berdiansk and Dnieper counties, noted that “they had the impression that after a series of promises from various authorities ..., the peasants lost faith in these promises ...” (SARF, f. 355, op. 1, d. 4, pp. 50, 52). Such observations date from the first decade of June 1920. Above we have noted that already in the first decade of September 1920 the peasants thought otherwise.

An example of the restrained attitude of peasants to the agrarian legislation of the P. Wrangel government is the case in one of the villages of Simferopol district, which is characteristic in general of all parishes in this locality. The land surveyor, in conversation with the peasants, asked if they knew anything about the agrarian legislation of the Government of Southern Russia. The peasants of the East found a misunderstanding of the situation. A DALU employee drew their attention to a document affixed on the bulletin board. “We know this law”, they respond enthusiastically. At the same time, the villagers agree to have the surveyor explain it to them. During the explanation of the Order, it became clear that the peasants were well aware of its meaning. This time the misunderstanding was demonstrated

by an employee of DALU. In response, the villagers explained to him: “We had many laws: land and land. Just hang out at the town board and nothing else. Depends, hangs, then remove, the other hang. As General Wrangel’s law was hanged, so we read it, but waited for it to be taken down and hanged by another’. At the same time, as the land surveyor noted, since the Order was appealing to the peasants, they studied it by heart and expected the authorities to take concrete steps to implement it. ‘When the peasants saw that this law was created not only to hang on the board near the district board, but also to put it into practice, they joined in the long-awaited reform” (SARF, f. 355, op. 1, d. 20, pp. 30–31 rev.).

Thus, the attitude of the peasantry, landowners of the South of Ukraine to the agrarian legislation of P. Wrangel was determined by the reasons of a socio-economic, socio-political and subjective nature. The range ranged from open aversion (from the landlords), a restrained attitude to active interest (from the peasants, the Red Army, soldiers and officers of P. Wrangel’s army).

Summarizing the above, we note that P. Wrangel’s agrarian reform was widely understood as a system of measures that influenced the socio-economic situation in the countryside, the socio-political activity of the peasantry. P. Wrangel’s agrarian reform did not limit the redistribution of land among peasants. He considered the cornerstone of the intensification of agriculture as an industry, improving the material wealth of peasants, transforming the peasantry into a leading social class.

The main provisions of the agricultural legislation of P. Wrangel were consistent with the content of the agricultural legislation of the governments of the Directorate of the UPR, Soviet Russia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria and other countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe. So, firstly, P. Wrangel in the south of Ukraine and the authorities of Romania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Estonia and other countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe advocated the principle of alienation or expropriation of excess land tenure in solving the agrarian question. Secondly, the granting of peasants by additional areas of land in the south of Ukraine and in European countries was for a fee. They could not exceed 25 des. Thirdly, the size of non-alienated land in both southern Ukraine and Europe, taking into account the relevant regional characteristics of soil quality and fertility, the level of intensification of agriculture, land shortages for one peasant farm, etc., fluctuated within approximately the same limits. Fourthly, the political and economic future of their countries by the leadership of the aforementioned European countries and P. Wrangel was unambiguously linked to the institute of a private ownership of land, the economically developed agricultural sector of the economy, profitable single peasant farms. The peasantry was understood as the guarantor of such prospects. In the case of Soviet Russia, what was common was that the Bolsheviks, like P. Wrangel, chose to support the middle-class peasantry as the main focus of an agricultural policy.

Aware of the need for quality changes aimed at intensifying agriculture as a sector of the economy, P. Wrangel worked in this direction. In our estimation of efficiency of this work, in our opinion it is necessary to consider the conditions under which it was carried out. Despite the adverse circumstances, P. Wrangel’s agrarian reform in southern Ukraine was fruitful. Its conduct, firstly, testifies that the Commander-in-Chief took care of improvement of land management, improvement of agro-technical cultivation of land, provision of peasant farms with agricultural machinery, seed fund, working cattle and so on. Secondly, the measures taken by the government did not seek to exacerbate the authorities’ relations with the peasantry. On the contrary, every effort was made to minimize confrontation in the countryside. Thirdly, an agrarian reform was based on the principles of the state protectionism of the peasantry.



**The Conclusions.** Among the clear achievements of P. Wrangel's agrarian reform were the following results: 1) the peasant character of an agrarian legislation and agrarian reform in general, aimed at preserving livestock, including breeding stock, providing peasant farms with agricultural machinery and stock, seeds; 2) the complimentary attitude of the peasantry of the South of Ukraine to the activities of the white civil authorities during the sowing, harvesting, normalization of lease relations, intensification of the agrarian sector as an economic sector; 3) in the course of an agrarian reform in the south of Ukraine, 3145 peasants became the real owners of the land, which was confirmed by the relevant legal documents, according to which 66,725 des. of land were secured into private ownership. None of the governments that took part in the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917 – 1921 achieved this.

**Funding.** The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

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*The article was received on February 25, 2020.*

*Article recommended for publishing 26/11/2020.*