

## ЄВРОПЕЙСЬКА ІНТЕГРАЦІЯ: ІСТОРІЯ ТА СУЧАСНІСТЬ

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### QUO VADIS, DEAR EU?

#### (THE EVOLUTION OF EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGIES APPROACHES IN THE CHANGING EUROPEAN UNION)

***Abstract.** Nowadays European Union is facing challenges of immigration, the threat of radicalization, downturns in the fiscal and monetary policies, as well as the discussions on how to build bridges with the UK after Brexit. Such concerns are crucial for understanding the EU's political and economic landscape, shaping global security issues as well.*

*The article attempts to analyze the circumstances favoring the implementation of the EU's Global Strategy that served to be strategic reality-checks upon how to bring stability and security to Europe. It shapes the period from the origins of the European security strategies till the new era of the EU presented by EU Global Strategy in 2016.*

*The article questions whether the political will is deeply essential for the EU to remain solid tackling economic and political challenges. Therefore, the article is divided in two parts, namely: 1) the evolution of the EU security strategies; 2) the hybrid challenges for Europe shaped by EU Global Strategy.*

*It is concluded that the EU should perceive the concept of the adaptability as pivotal in order to find credible and fit-for-purpose solutions and create the full-fledged EU Global Strategy. The latter still needs to be adapted to the civilian and integrated capabilities in order to become a real global strategy.*

**Key words:** *European Union, the EU Global Strategy, hybrid challenges, integration, security.*

This history of the European integration project has never been so under the question than in the last decades. The paradigm of stable democracy seems to have vanished into abyssal depths, especially in the light of its apparent lack of strength and vision to lead through the period of lingering turbulence where global powers, like US, China and Russia are redefining fundamental rules of foreign and security policy. Moreover, the EU member-states are facing challenges coming from the new type of information warfare that Russia has presented since its conflict with Ukraine. The deteriorating situation and various crises continue to plague territories in the EU Eastern and Southern neighborhoods. During these challenging times, EU steps up with initiatives not only to work consistently but ‘hand-in-hand’ with foreign security and defense sectors. Enthusiasm alone, however, is not enough.

This article aims to analyze the most crucial areas of cooperation for the EU set by its global strategy on foreign and security affairs such as security and defence. The issues referring to the EU are not only complex, but trying to counter r and migrants and refugee crises, hybrid threats as well as terrorism. Therefore, the importance of efficient and effective security approach of the EU has become more than critical in order to tackle new and old issues.

In these upcoming security challenges, the questions remaining are how not to jeopardize liberal democratic values and, at the same time to resist hybrid threats; how to establish strong economic ties among EU and global partners and, finally, how to protect people and make the international law norms being respected.

In order to answer these issues, the article presents two parts. The first part tries to demonstrate the theoretical background in order to outline the European common foreign and security policy evolution (ECFSP) with focus points of Italian and Estonian scholars. The second part analyses the current challenges that EU is facing taking into consideration the existing EU Global Strategy (2016).

Traditionally, the array of instruments for European project's key priority – foreign policy, and, in particular, security and defense dimensions, has always faced controversies and disputes. The approach to tune security for a perfect «sound» is not new in Europe. Conflicts, instability and overwhelming crisis have been putting into difficulty governments to find proper responses. The EU's toolbox already encompasses a vast amount of instruments, both political and economic in order to stand straight against the challenges.

The ECFSP got interests of many scholars from many European countries. A special priority in its evolution and rationale was given to the Italian scholars. The choice is merely strategic due to the involvement of especially Italian experts in the development of the EUGS, in particular, the representatives of Italian international institute (IAI).

Among those who theorized the issues of CFSP and CFDP there were A. Marroni, N. Pirozzi and P. Sartori who presented opinions on how the differentiated integration made an impact on CFSP and CFDP of the European Union [9]. These researchers were among those who made joint papers dedicated to the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Treaty of Rome celebration. Therefore, this complex work «EU60: Re-Founding Europe. The Responsibility to Propose» [9] is one of the most recent editions dedicated to EU challenges varying from political and economic till security turns.

Global geopolitical transformations that influenced on the European Union, especially in what concerns the new ways of economic and political crisis in the EU were presented in F. Alberti [2], L. Caracciolo [7], R. Aliboni and G. Bonvincini [3] works.

Institutional trends in CFSP/CFDP were analyzed by the scholars of the Italian Institute of Foreign Affairs: G. Bonvincini and E. Regelsberger [6] presented their opinions on CFSP in its evolution till the Constitutional Treaty, N. Pirozzi and S. Sandawi stipulated on the ECDP Military missions [15], G. Bonvincini and M. Comelli advanced their opinions on how the process of deepening and widening

of the EU made an impact on the ECFSP [5]. A special interest has a 2017-year research by G. Faleg where this Italian scholar redefines the idea of the EU comprehensive approach towards security [10].

Moreover, Italy's IAI Director and Special Advisor to EU High Representative F. Mogherini, Natalie Tocci, presented her own research on explaining the vision of the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) [19]. Her insights were useful in order to understand the logic of the EUGS and its structure.

However, this article also takes into consideration the North European (Estonian) point of view presented by International Center for Defense and Security. The ideas of K. Raik, P. Jarenpaa [17], T. Lawrence, H. Praks [14] are valuable for a better understanding of how EU can guarantee its security and its challenges towards such a path. Moreover, the joint research presented in 2017 by H.-P. Bartels, A.M. Kellner and U. Optenhogel «Strategic Autonomy and the Defense of Europe», encompasses the dilemmas of the security strategies both within EU and NATO [4].

Until the late 1990s, the EU made progress in developing common foreign and security policy. However, it didn't have enough efforts to advance common security and defense policy. The launch of ECFSP was a significant step forward, but the EU was lacking military capability to respond to international conflicts.

Meanwhile, starting from 1998, UK and France made first steps towards European security within Saint-Malo declaration. It served to be a setting basis for EU leaders to agree at the Helsinki summit (1999) to develop the capability to deploy a European military force. The key priority to reinforce European solidarity was within establishing European military force to have an 'autonomous and rapid action' mandate [13]. According to the Helsinki summit the EU member-states agreed that the EU military capability to act till 2003 should be to create European rapid reaction forces, comprising troops from all EU member-states. It was agreed that the capability to deploy 60.000 military personal at 60 days notice at a distance of 4.000 km from Brussels for at least one full year in order to execute the «Petersberg tasks» [12, p. 484]. Moreover, in order to fulfill Amsterdam Treaty requirements for

humanitarian, peacekeeping, rescue, combat forces tasks in crisis management as well as other operations, EU should have about 180.000 troops [17, p. 4]. Moreover, as far the Helsinki headline goal was to have the capacity for ‘autonomous actions supported by credible military forces’, it led to the CFDP advancement and fostered EU-NATO cooperation [17, p. 4]. However, ECFDP wasn’t developed to create a real European army or to re-assist NATO’s role for territorial defense. Standing for the basis of peace, EU was seen as a unique model for foreign and economic policy.

Since beginning of 2000s, the decisions to establish European rapid reaction forces were implemented within important institutional changes. Subsequent summits tried to respond how to do strategic planning, some aspects of establishing common armed forces and the usage of non-military civilian measures [12, p. 485].

Firstly, this idea was realized within Laeken Summit in 2001. The EU member-states supported ambition to establish their own political and defense institutions to address conflicts by civilian means within European Capability Action Plan [12, p. 486].

Secondly, the 2003 European Security Strategy structured necessary instruments to create a ‘ring of friends’ in its own neighborhood as presented by the President of the European Commission Romano Prodi [16]. It goes beyond only democratic values approach, but sets preconditions to contribute to security and development to global peace [4, p. 14]. This security confidence was also reflected in the words of the Security Strategy «A Secure Europe in a Better World» presented by Javier Solana in 2003 [1]. This Security Strategy marked the attempt for the EU to advance a distinct approach to security presented as comprehensive and cooperative as well as collaborating with UN [17, p. 7].

When the European Union adopted this security strategy, it was the outcome of some of the crucial security changes both on its territory and worldwide. Firstly, the outcomes of the Balkan wars, enhanced by the 9/11 terroristic attacks on the US and leading to Iraq War impact on the EU to have a hard landing in reality far from European integration peace goal [17, p. 3]. EU had to make certain conclusions after

its inefficient response to the armed conflict in Kosovo where it simply failed to intervene to stop the conflict.

Thirdly, 2004 was a benchmark for two essential steps. It was the time when EU member-states modified Helsinki headline goal and adopted new guidelines for the EU to be able to deploy by 2010 their military contingents under crisis management within 5 days. Moreover, it was the time to establish European Defense Agency being an institution to solve various matters [12, p. 488].

However, these strategies didn't shape enough the political dramas taking place within Europe: Kosovo declaration of independence, NATO's Bucharest summit and Russian-Georgian war [19, p. 10]. It simply demonstrated the lack of consensus about existing security strategy approaches and the desperate need for new principles to tackle threats. Meanwhile, the new European security strategy of 2008 could bear risks of fomenting EU fiscal crises and bringing all talks far from foreign and security policy.

A decade after Solana Security Strategy, being viewed as an advocator of global peace and just economic order, EU revised its security doctrine by presenting a new one in 2016.

Entitled as «Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe», the New and Big Strategy advanced essential steps towards joint threats for EU and NATO. The EU High Representative F. Mogherini presented Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy during EU Council in June 2016. Her special remarks were indicating key vision of it: «As Europeans we must take greater responsibility for our security. We must be ready and able to deter, respond to, and protect ourselves against external threats» [8].

It served to indicate that the illegal annexation of Crimea, Syria crisis as well as Russian actions on the Eastern part of Ukraine, called for joint actions in order to re-evaluate the issues of territorial defense for European and transatlantic security priorities. Moreover, EU and NATO have acknowledged to be in simultaneous dangers present on Eastern and South borders [17, p. 8].

EUGS stepped up with such prioritized approach: dealing with external conflicts via integrated approach, resilience of states and societies in the Eastern and Southern neighborhoods and ensuring cooperative and stable regional orders in order to protect its citizens [18, p. 9-10]. However, from all of these goals, the most questionable, according to Italian scholars, remained the issue of resilience because it indicated the EU's trajectory towards security in its neighborhoods [19, p. 88]. The Estonian researchers explain it by the fact that EU's previous actions were to increase the Union norms and values. The new EU vision of its partners is to support them in their willingness to become more capable while countering crises and threats [17, p. 11]. Therefore, EUGS advances higher level of security and defense ambitions, merely prioritizing joints crisis management in areas of high security risks, close air and maritime support and surveillance [18, p. 8-10]. It is another response to a number of issues driving for more Europe in defense. In such a way, it answers to the adamant goal to deal with threats via integrated approach.

The EU member-states capacity-building is one of the objectives for CSDP missions and operations especially with regards to advising, training, and mentoring inside the security sector. The CSDP will foster greater and more systemic contribution to the resilience of partner-countries taking into consideration those who are threatened by conflict or instability, in synergy with other EU actors along the security nexus [11, p. 9].

The importance of countering hybrid threats being of the internal-external security nature is pivotal for EUGS. This includes the areas of strategic communication, cyber security and border security for EU member-states as well its neighboring partners [11, p. 10].

N. Tocci stipulates that being a 'post-Lisbon' Security Strategy, EUGS tried to shape the issues of security and defense with much broader EU external action instruments [19, p. 90]. In 2016 a list of new security initiatives was launched with ideas proposed to increase the role of the Union in the security and defense field. With many options on the table, EU had to interpret and explain EUGS in the

detailed agenda and program. These included the possibility to implement Permanent Structured Cooperation mentioned in the Lisbon Treaty. In such a way, EU defense cooperation seems to have taken steps forward advocating multiple-speed principle.

Moreover, a Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) and Commission's European Defence Action Plan (EDAP) as well as European Defence Funds were presented in order to implement Lisbon Treaty provisions [14, p. 4]. Meanwhile, coordination of EU-NATO activities remains one of the most sensitive in the domain of defense capabilities due to the wake of Ukraine and Syria conflicts [17, p. 16]. NATO continued to advocate for 2% of GDP budget spending for all its members which is still problematic for the majority of its countries. In its turn, EU feels lack of support for capabilities as well as political will together with necessary funds for ECDP *modus operandi* [19, p. 126-127]. Defence remains fundamental while talking about national sovereignty. It remains sensitive and problematic issue during the last two years especially when EU had elections in its major member-states as well as in the US. Ranging from developments in defence, there is still a great need to increase its effectiveness, cooperation and cohesion. In order to tackle it, the EU member-states argued about PESCO membership with determined but challenging targets to be reached within defined time periods. These should include measures to review progress which can be presented in CARD [14, p. 10].

The New Global Strategy appears to be more strategic and pragmatic in its scope while presenting EU goals. It advances regional priorities in its neighborhoods not forgetting its global prospective. The Estonian scholars view it as being more rooted into EU's 'realpolitik [4, p. 20]'. They welcome that the EUGS presents one of its goal as protection of EU citizens making contrast to the existing concept» of «defence». The principle 'to protect' is broader shaping terroristic threats and radicalization being prioritized as key insecurities among EU citizens [17, p. 11].

In such a way, Estonian scholars advance the opinion that EUGS takes into consideration progressive amalgamation of the issues concerning internal and external security.

Italian approach is based on the fact that by presenting its Global Strategy, EU would like to break the arc of instability which formed instead of ‘ring of friends’. The conflicts in the EU neighborhood merely starting from the Horn of Africa, continuing to the Middle East and shaping Eastern part of Ukraine make evidence that the Union is paralyzed not only internally, but also externally and where dominance is power-based [10, p. 3].

However, EU has still a long way to become a global strategy. The preconditions lie in the EU itself which is merely a political actor and still in need to follow the path in order to become autonomous strategic and unitary player on the global stage. Therefore, it would be unfair to criticize EUGS for a lack of strategic vision and defined time framework. And, it seems fair that G. Faleg called security and defense dimension of EUGS based on the principle ‘learning by doing’. In such a way, this Italian scholar would like to stress the importance of systematic pressures that, especially, ECFDP had while trying to adapt to the value of civilian and integrated capabilities [10, p. 5].

*Conclusion.* European integration project has been spurred by challenges and threats within and beyond its borders. However, never more than today EU has been under the question when both to its East and South it is plunged into unprecedented waives of insecurity. It enhances the pressure and influence in order to destabilize its member-states from its internal side without even stepping on the territory.

With trying to find fit-for-purpose solution, Europe is facing a key question of principle: is it better for EU defense cooperation to be driven by unity or trajectory itself towards effectiveness? It is becoming more evident that military and, especially, non-military threats are more and more intertwined indicating that the EU’s soft power approaches for capabilities.

In this regards, EU should understand that adaptivity is pivotal in order to find credible and fit-for-purpose solutions and have fully-fledged EU Global Strategy. The EU Global Strategy made an attempt to reactive EU-NATO cooperation. In such a

way, NATO remains responsible for collective defence and military crisis operations and the EU shapes civilian-military missions.

The EU still needs to develop mechanisms to advocate for better defense budgets spending. However, the initiatives that are currently discussed raise the questions to what extent there is going to be enough of political will in order to for European security and defense to be a turning point and for EU member-states to fulfill their obligations especially in the period when its major countries face elections time.

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## **КУДИ РУХАЄТЬСЯ ЄВРОПЕЙСЬКИЙ СОЮЗ ? (ЕВОЛЮЦІЯ ПІДХОДІВ У ЄВРОПЕЙСЬКИХ БЕЗПЕКОВИХ СТРАТЕГІЯХ У ЧАСИ НЕВИЗНАЧЕНОСТІ ТА ШВИДКИХ ЗМІН ЄС)**

***Анотація.** У статті репрезентовано погляд на виклики, що пов'язані із інтеграційними процесами в Європейському Союзі. Дослідження цієї проблематики здійснено завдяки аналізу італомовних та естонських джерел та літератури.*

*Завдяки аналізу Глобальної стратегії ЄС, подані думки щодо вироблення нового комплексне бачення зовнішньої і безпекової політики та політики оборони ЄС. Визначено, що у Глобальній стратегії закладений амбітний вихід Європейського Союзу на новий рівень. Прослідкована тенденція до подальшої адаптивності як ключового підходу для імплементації положень Глобальної стратегії Європейського Союзу. Розкривається взаємозв'язок та особливість інтересів держав-членів та самого Європейського Союзу щодо консолідованого майбутнього ЄС.*

*Стаття актуалізує дискусії щодо того, чому необхідна політична воля держав-членів ЄС для того, щоб сам ЄС вирішував спільні економічні та політичні проблеми, які впливають на його парадигму безпеки. Відповідно,*

*стаття поділяється на дві частини: 1) еволюція розвитку стратегій безпеки ЄС; 2) гібридні виклики для Європи, на які має відповісти Глобальна стратегія ЄС.*

*Відповідно, Глобальній стратегії ЄС іще необхідно пройти шлях свого становлення, щоб її головний орієнтир на глобальний простір став актуалізованим.*

**Ключові слова:** *Європейський Союз, Глобальна стратегія ЄС, Європейський Союз, гібридні виклики, інтеграція, безпека.*

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