

Ihor Kushnarev, PhD in Law

*V. M. Koretsky Institute of State and Law of National Academy
of Sciences of Ukraine*

ASIAN STATES IN FIGHT AGAINST POLITICAL CORRUPTION: EXPERIENCE OF REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE, HONG KONG, CHINA AND POST-SOVIET CENTRAL ASIAN STATES

Peculiarities of forms of political corruption, mechanisms of anti-corruption fight, comparison of methods of corruption practices prevention in Asian states are presented. Contrasting Asian states are analysed: the most successful in the sphere of anticorruption strategies are Singapore and Hong Kong; China, that has chosen repressive methods in fight against corruption; post-Soviet states of Central Asia (on the example of Tajikistan and Kirgizstan) are outsiders of anti-corruption rating. Accent is given to national peculiarities of fight against political corruption.

Keywords: political corruption, anti-corruption policy, Singapore, Hong Kong, China, post-Soviet states of Central Asia.

At present political corruption remains an integral attribute of the political reality. It is characteristic for both the most developed and the most backward states of our planet for some level. Still for the last half-century some of them managed achieve striking success in anti-corruption fight: either with the help of democratic reformation transformations, or with use of rigid, authoritarian methods. Other consolidate anti-corruption programs to declarations, populism or cosmetic measures.

Asia is, in general, problematic region according to the criteria of intensiveness of corruption practices in politics and other activity spheres. There may be distinguished leader-states and states-outsiders in anti-corruption fight: there are some having developed a rather strong immunity to different manifestations of political corruption, and some imitating anti-corruption reforms, there are some trying to rely on democratic foundations and some who use unpopular authoritarian mechanisms in search of socially useful results.

Our research task is to discover the peculiarities of the forms of political corruption and the mechanisms of anti-corruption struggle in Asian countries. It is necessary to emphasize that fight against different types of corruption, including political and traditional, is main theme of inter-political fight of many Asian states. Nevertheless, in most of them (Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, etc.) this fight was restricted to the periods of preparing and conduction of elections, and was later nullified and limited to the aims of populist propaganda campaigns to get even with political competitors. L. Gladchenko¹ gives for example political frauds of clans of presidents H. M. Soeharto (Indonesia), F. Marcos and C. Aquino (Philippines), Roh Tae-woo (South Korea), prime-minister Th. Shinawatra (Thailand).

To fulfil set tasks, it is necessary to analyse number of contrasting Asian states: 1) most successful in the sphere of anti-corruption strategies – Singapore and Hong Kong (so-called “Asian-tigers”); 2) China, which have chosen repressive methods of fight against corruption; 3) one state of the post-Soviet space – Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, which embody the conservatism of managerial technologies burdened with the totalitarian Soviet past. In attrition for drawing some parallels in analysis we will apply experience of other states of Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, etc.).

Singapore. In the research analysis of the problem of political corruption in the states of Asia Singapore was studied for the first time in the middle of 20th century², and at the same time this country (as well as Hong Kong) is set as an example of successful anti-corruption project³.

¹ Gladchenko, L. (2014). Об опыте Сингапура по противодействию коррупции. *Проблемы национальной стратегии*, 3 (24), 130.

² Сиротин А. Опыт борьбы с коррупцией в Сингапуре. *Суда нет*. <http://sudonet.ru/borba_s_corrupciei_v_singapore> (2017, June, 12).

³ Поліщук, А. (2016). Правила протидії корупції і досвід для України: Грузія і Сінгапур. *Національний юридичний журнал: теорія і практика*, 5, 166-169.

In times when Singapore was British colony, overall corruption was socially acceptable everyday thing. Risk for the corruptionist was open and punishment – miserable. Anti-corruption fight in Singapore began yet in 1871 when Penal Code of the Straits Settlements was passed, in which corruption was said to be beyond the law. Soon corruption was admitted as one of the problems with which British authorities did not cope. Researchers¹ assume that there were three problems for this: 1) those time favourable conditions for corruption; 2) low salaries; 3) insignificant possibility of investigation and punishment. The public thought of that time was tolerant to corruption: there was typical for most Asian states tolerable attitude to it, corruptive actions “were rather norm, moreover, for all stratum of society”². Singapore was in very difficult economic situation, which even more contributed to the large-scale corruption of its various types.

The breakthrough took place when the People’s Action Party, having won in elections in 1959, formed a government and initiated the Anti-Corruption Act (POCA, 1960). Nowadays Singapore is one of the least corrupted states of the world. Yet in 1996 Political and Economic Risk Consultancy (PERC) determined Singapore to be at the third place (after Switzerland and Australia) in the list of the least corrupted countries of the world. From the PERC resume: “Anti-corruption legislative base exists in all countries, but in none of them the law is kept to so clearly and steadily as in Singapore. Corrupted officials, especially high-ranking officials, are faced in Singapore with the opposition of unprecedented severity”³.

According to the data of “Transparency International” in the 2016 rating of states (The Corruption Perceptions Index) Singapore with the index 84 held 7th position of rating (this state is leader among Asian states), this index has not significantly oscillated for the years of conduction of evaluation.

The first prime minister of independent Singapore Lee Kuan Yew noticed in his memoirs that “political corruption in Singapore became especially more prominent during preparation and conduction of electoral campaigns of different levels. Then the competition of ideas, programs of candidates for elected positions was often supplanted by the competition of wallets⁴. Singaporean leaders realized that such “commercial democracy”, caused by considerable expenditures on the election campaign, starts the engine of corruption, since the electoral capitalization of sponsors must necessarily be converted into non-competitive government contracts and unlawful preferences, assigning positions. The high cost of elections was recognized to be a curse for many Asian states.

Already after first elections in independent Singapore, leaders of the state brought to light all the information about income, real estate, commercial interests, etc. Taking the oath, members of the first government clothed white, symbolizing honesty of the behaviour in personal and public life.

Anti-corruption legislation of Singapore (Law “On corruption prevention”⁵ and other acts) foresee expanded determination of improper benefits. It became expansive and criminally punishable to abuse own powers: maximal fines for corruption were increased in ten times; intentional misinterpretation began to be qualified as crime, punished by imprisonment and high fines, etc. Government of Lee Kuan Yew managed to achieve total intolerance to corruption by public. Authorities showed on the practice that if there would be any violations found, none of the positions would serve as rescue.

Main authority of Singapore, established yet in 1952 for fight against corruptions is Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau, which above all investigated events of corruption at the highest levels of government. The CPIB, was given extraordinary powers and became direct executor of political will of the government of Singapore in the cases of rooting out political and other forms of corruption. This Bureau executes both preventive and repressive functions at the same time.

Success of Singapore, perhaps, was stipulated by, first, will and sequence of higher leaders of the state, as well as implemented (despite world practice) the principle “presumption of guilt” for state officials. The last foresees that any “encouragement” of the official is considered as corruption stimulus

¹ Quah, J. (2001). Combating Corruption in Singapore: What Can Be Learned? *Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management*, 9 (1), 29-35.

² Гладченко, Л. (2014). Об опыте Сингапура по противодействию коррупции. *Проблемы национальной стратегии*, 3 (24), 127.

³ Quah, J. (2001). Combating Corruption in Singapore: What Can Be Learned? *Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management*, 9 (1), 29-35.

⁴ Куан, Ю. Ли (2010). *Сингапурская история: 1965–2000 гг. Из третьего мира – в первый*. Москва: МГИМО-Университет, 154.

⁵ Prevention of Corruption Act. *Singapore Statutes Online*. <<http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/aol/download/0/0/pdf/binaryFile/pdfFile.pdf?CompId:ca83fcad-3903-4a8a-a53f-93ae7c167568>> (2017, July, 09).

(award for services), until contrary is proven; proof of innocence relies on the suspect himself. Such strategy of fight against corruption is authoritarian and efficient. After all, because of this, as well as the will of the state leadership to change, the social disease that is corruption is successfully managed in Singapore. The last is emphasized by Ukrainian researcher L. Shmal, who attributed to the system of factors of fight against corruption in Singapore “presence of strict political will of the leaders of the state, passing efficient anti-corruption legislation, application of efficient administrative measures, establishing of specialized institute for fight against corruption”¹.

Singapore came down to the problem of fight against political corruption with priority task to root out firstly those conditions contributing to it, but not only to criminal prosecution of corruptionist. Anti-corruption strategy of Singapore is based on the principle “logics in the control over corruption”², that is “[...] attempts for rooting out corruption should be grounded on the intention to minimize or exclude conditions creating both motivation and possibilities, inclination of the person for making corruption actions”³.

There are no exemptions in this state concerning investigating proceedings of higher officials and politicians, control of the income of political corruptionists is permanent, but not fragmented (as in some countries this is “recalled” only during electoral campaigns, especially while conducting opposition research for political opponents). For the years of anti-corruption campaign there was number of loud accusations of higher officials, for example, concerning minister of national development Tan Kia Gan, minister of environment protection Wee Toon Boon, minister of national development The Cheang Wan and others.

Providing financial package for state officials, increase of salary and prestige value of their work were other methods used to fight corruption in Singapore. It is necessary to cite prime-minister Lee Kuan Yew here: “Little authorities given to people, who cannot live in dignity on their salary, create motivation for their improper use”⁴. Remuneration of labour of prime minister of Singapore (around 600 thousand USD) significantly exceeds remuneration of heads of leading states of the world. Still, it is necessary to consider, that in many states official salary is not principle income of the first persons of the states (there are privileges, which are minimized in Singapore)⁵. All privileges and preferences are considered as such which spoil a person, make him/her to be “pirouette”, what gives birth to political and bureaucratic corruption. Singaporean ministers are responsible before prime minister, and every half year report about income (their own and of members of their families). In case when prime minister has doubts concerning honesty of members of his cabinet, he initiates official investigation. In general, experience of Singapore demonstrated that adequate remuneration is vitally important for maintenance honesty and morality of politicians and higher officials.

Thus wise, Singapore managed to create climate of honesty and openness which shifted political corruption to the category of socially unacceptable events. Still, despite the fact, that experience of this state may be put as an example, is not fully adaptive (while considering different national peculiarities) for the most states of the world, for which issue of political corruption is in agenda.

Hong Kong. Researcher S. Rose-Ackerman puts as example not only Singapore, but also another Asian state – Hong Kong for those states, which have created successful independent anti-corruption authorities, subordinating directly only to the head of the government or parliament⁶. Corruption of all types on all levels was characteristic feature in Hong Kong for a long time: yet in the end of 1950s – beginning of 1960s corruption wholly involved state (as well as private) sectors. Like in the case with Singapore corruption in Hong Kong of those times was a style of life, necessary to survive. The level of corruption

¹ Шмаль, Л. (2015). Сінгапурська модель протидії корупції: досвід для України, *Науковий часопис Національної академії прокуратури України*, 2, 110.

² Шмаль, Л. (2015). Сінгапурська модель протидії корупції: досвід для України, *Науковий часопис Національної академії прокуратури України*, 2, 113.

³ Номоконов, В. (1999). *Организованная преступность: тенденции, перспективы борьбы*. Владивосток: Издательство Дальневосточного университета.

⁴ Ткачук, Д. Досвід боротьби з корупцією. Сінгапур. *Українська правда*. <<http://www.pravda.com.ua/columns/2014/12/5/7046467/>> (2017, July, 12).

⁵ В Сингапуре карманы чиновников проверяют руки правосудия. *Новая газета*. <<https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2006/10/12/27619-v-singapore-karmanu-chinovnikov-proveryayut-ruki-pravosudiya>> (2017, August, 14).

⁶ Роуз-Аккерман, С. (2003). *Коррупция и государство. Причины, следствия, реформы*. Москва: Логос.

of that time was metaphorically described: “they said it is possible “to get on the bus” (that is actively join the corruptive practices) or “to run beyond” (be the outsider, not included to the set system of the rules of political play), but it is not possible “to stay in front of the bus, moving forward” (that means to resist, complain).

The impetus for change was the economic and demographic crisis of the beginning of 1970s, which led to an increase in protest attitudes of the population, as well as a wave of popular speeches of 1973 caused by the escape of a high-ranking official suspected in corruption. The Independent Commission Against Corruption was established in 1974. Not only repressive way of punishment, but also measures of prevention corruption practices were selected as methods to fight against corruption. Success of anti-corruption fight became possible only because of subsequent support of the state: both in Singapore and in Hong Kong political will of the higher leaders was demonstrated.

Currently, Hong Kong refers to the “cleanest” Asian countries (according to the Corruption Perceptions Index), being led by only Singapore: with 77 points out of 100 possible in 2016 (16th in the world); over the past five years, these positions have remained virtually unchanged (fluctuations of 74-77 points). According to the results of the public opinion polls¹ the activity of the ICAC is approved by around 99 percent of questioned. About 90 percent of all the information about illegal corruption acts has public as their source². And recently (at the beginning of 1970s) less than a third of citizens were ready to provide information concerning themselves.

The presumption of innocence was annulled for Hongkongese officials as well as for Singaporean. De facto there are laws resembling military tribunal in case of presence of a reasonable suspicion of a person. Those giving bribes are no more prosecuted in Hong Kong (thus, official is always guilty). The fundamental of anti-corruption success is considered being not as establishing and activity of the ICAC, but rather “real public control over activity of this commission, which did not allow it to become a part of this criminal network”³.

People’s Republic of China (PRC). The problem of political and other types of corruption is far more complicated in China, anti-corruption strategies of this state are difficult to compare with previous states at least while considering territorial, social-demographic and other peculiarities. China as a state has the millennial tradition of a privileged bureaucracy, and this impedes the emergence of effective democratic anti-corruption mechanisms.

Yet Chinese politician-communist Deng Xiaoping said, “There is no use fighting against crimes and getting rid of social injuries with a soft hand”. World media regularly inform about capital punishments of local corruptionists, while Chinese media broadcast executions of the sentences. This demonstrates understanding of the fact that repressive fight against corruption is determined to be a formula of prosperity of the country. For a long time, the PRC fought rather with symptoms of the problem (thus, corruptionists) than with the sources of appearance of corruption practices in politics. Only for the period of 2000–2010 about 10 thousand officials were shoot dead for corruption in the PRC, that is three persons a day at average⁴; still, it is necessary to notice, that the accurate number of sentenced to death is not fully known, as according to the laws of the PRC such information should not be disclosed. There was practice of making of default decisions of sentences in the county. In general, for the last thirty years around a million of representatives of party-state apparatus were brought to criminal responsibility because of corruptive actions. Nevertheless, despite public capital punishments and life sentences, China did not manage to root out political and other types of corruption.

Chinese public official Jiang Zemin in the end of the 20th – beginning of the 21st centuries formulated new principles of fight against corruption, which combined prophylactic and radical measures. A. Makarov shows among the ways to fight corruption in modern China the following firstly: 1) constant

¹ Харичева, М. Борьба с коррупцией: опыт Гонконга. *Калининградский университет МВД*.

<https://xn--80aaiifradibgfzb7br.xn--b1agajc0ayikbb.xn--b1aew.xn--p1ai/upload/site126/document_file/3cSPxGEDrj.pdf> (2017, September, 12).

² Yeung, J.Au. Fighting Corruption – The Hong Kong Experience, <<http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/apcity/unpan002750.pdf>> (2017, September, 17).

³ Лавренюк, Ю. (2014). Досвід запобігання та протидії корупції у країнах Азіатсько-Тихоокеанського регіону, *Ефективність державного управління*, 39, 44–45.

⁴ Макаров, А. (2012). Коррупция: опыт успешной борьбы Китая и реальность современной России. *Государственная власть и местное самоуправление*, 3, 13–21.

rotation of personal in all governmental authorities; 2) control over provincial level of party and state apparatus, restriction of its independence (instead strict terms to follow the idea of the centre)¹.

L. Smirnova draws attention to preservation of strict orientation of criminal anti-corruption policy in legislation and law enforcement of the PRC, what is expressed in absence of the immunity from criminal persecution even of the highest officials. But according to the mentioned researcher, use of the capital punishment for corruption has decreased in the last years². It seems impossible to substantiate the last thought of L. Smirnova, as information about this is closed, what was previously mentioned.

The main weakness of Chinese anti-corruption system lays in preservation of conditions for corruption, and those are “discretionary methods of taking decisions and non-transparency of state administration”³. This, obviously proceeds from the fact that in traditional Chinese political culture, alike the west one, the accent was always given not to the law, but the moral education of people, called to take necessary state political decisions. State and political activists, having passed strict selection, were specific etalons of public morality and were given wide authorities for discretionary (that is up to their own mind) decision taking. At the same time such notions as the checks and balances system, fairness of procedures did not receive support in traditional China. Still today China regularly emphasizes on the unacceptability of the west model of powers division, and notions of law and party discipline (as interlacing of law and morality in ancient China) are interlaced in the system of anti-corruption fight. Interested persons and groups in the PRC realize their interests not through democratic mechanisms, but via corruptive lobbyism on the higher levels of the party.

Insufficient transparency of state management is characteristic for the PRC while considering peculiarities of political culture. There is no free state database for access to current legislation in the country. The laws are passed without public discussing and are not presented with open access. There is no official method of publicizing court decisions set by the law in the PRC – it is possible to find only some full texts of court decisions. There is no public access to the declarations of state officials about their income and property. Anti-corruption bureau as main anti-corruption authority in the PRC was established by the example of Hongkongese one (abovementioned ICAC), but this authority is not independent (subdivision of people’s prosecution), what decreases its efficiency.

Peculiarity of corruption situation in the PRC is “absence of unrepealed laws, rules for business conduction and receipt of licences for its conduction, absence of legal and efficient channels of the dialog between party authorities and private business, mechanism for consideration of interests of capital and new middle class”⁴.

Traditional attributes of previous political system are preserved in the PRC in 21st century: the monopoly of power in the hands of one party, the tendency to concentrate powers in the hands of one leader, ideological control over the media, the absence of mechanisms of public control over the actions of party and state bodies independent from the authorities. These and other factors significantly impede the effective eradication of political corruption in the PRC. Political corruption, which often has a clan or family background, is the main reason for deepening the crisis of confidence in the political institutions of the PRC. This leads to deepening the crisis confidence of Chinese to national political institutions.

In our opinion, the experience of the PRC demonstrates that the use of only cruel punishments is not enough to reduce the scale of political corruption, its containment. There is a need in rooting out the preconditions for the development of corruption practices, as well as attention to their prevention (preventive measures).

Studying of political corruption in the group of Central-Asian states, consisting of five post-Soviet independent republics (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) is worth additional attention. Reasons and manifestations of corruption practices in politics, conditioned not least by the preservation of the old traditions of state administration, the influence of the Soviet totalitarian heritage, etc., will be analysed on the example of one state of this group (Tajikistan).

¹ Макаров, А. (2012). Коррупция: опыт успешной борьбы Китая и реальность современной России. *Государственная власть и местное самоуправление*, 3, 17.

² Смирнова, Л. (2014). *Борьба с коррупцией в КНР: международный опыт и «особая китайская модель»*. Москва: Институт Дальнего Востока РАН, 15.

³ Смирнова, Л. (2014). *Борьба с коррупцией в КНР: международный опыт и «особая китайская модель»*. Москва: Институт Дальнего Востока РАН, 16.

⁴ Михеев, В. (2005). *Китай: угрозы, риски, вызовы развитию*. Москва: Московский Центр Карнеги, 25.

Central Asia, represented by post-Soviet states refers to the regions with extremely high corruption level. We will concentrate on the Tajikistan as one of the most corrupted states within the region. At the same time, this is the poorest and, potentially, geopolitically the most dangerous state of the region. Corruption in Tajikistan is so spread, that has received deep systemic character. Politicians of this country, in the spirit of the best populist traditions, declare the political will to anti-corruption struggle, but these statements are not supported by specific actions. Corruption Perceptions Index in Tajikistan for the last five years according to the data of Transparency International: 2012 – 22; 2013 – 22; 2014 – 23; 2015 – 26; 2016 – 25 points (this is 151st place in the world rating): these are definitely outsider positions.

Nowadays political and other forms of corruption in Tajikistan became real threat to functioning of statehood. International human rights activists state “the offensive of the state on the institutions of civil society”, democracy and the rule of law being “under threat”¹. Activists of new Tajik pro-democratic Internet movements mostly reside outside their motherland or function under pseudonym. De facto, elements of democracy are installed only declaratively, and all key decisions in authoritarian spirit depend from the head of the state.

Despite the fact, that Tajikistan ratified the United Nations Convention against Corruption, citizens do not have possibility to find out the income and property of the politicians. There is just insignificant percent of users of media alternative to state, new media in this state. Percent of internet-users is low: according to the data of the International Telecommunication Union only 19% of citizens use the Internet to some extent, only 9% have access to the network at home. Moreover, Tajik government and security services have practically unlimited possibilities of control over all types of communication in the country.

Strong traditions and cultural ties are preserved in Central-Asia region; even finances are less significant while comparing them to observance of customs. Under such circumstances, political corruption is present in the form of nepotism and cronyism. This reflects traditional values characteristic for Tajik society. Instead, there are no traditions of pluralistic political culture. Researcher E. Naurazova indicates “absence of access to information for citizens, non-observance of the legislation, inefficiency of the mechanisms of control and punishment, absence of control over political parties financing, usage of administrative resources and establishment of administrative barriers, control of political parties in regard of mass media means, etc.”² among main problems related to political corruption.

Corruption is traditionally strong in a situation where in a poor country the state has given itself wide powers. According to Tajik expert A. Mastov, there are following reasons of political corruption in Tajikistan “absence of political competition, free elections, independent judges and mass media, as well as absence of budget transparency and state apparatus, gin up for incredible size”³.

Firstly, political corruption in Tajikistan is observed in the area of financing of political parties. The Law “On political parties” adopted yet in 1998, with insignificant amendments introduced from that time. Researchers of the problem of financing of political parties of Tajikistan emphasize on the complexity of the issue because of the closeness of such information; parties and party members avoid this issue in all possible ways – commentaries are limited only to the emphasise on the importance of membership fees⁴. At the same time, paragraph 3 of the Article 3 of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (2004) commits countries, which have ratified it, to take all relevant measures on strengthening of transparency of financing candidates for elective office, and, if it is possible, financing of political parties. International institutions have repeatedly drawn the attention of the Tajik authorities to the need for modernization of the party financing system, as this is a pre-condition for their independence from the excessive influence of sponsors. Nevertheless, nowadays there is no systemic or subsequent approach to legislature on financing of political activity and election campaigns in Tajikistan.

In case of separating out state source of parties financing, there is no direct support in Tajikistan. There is only indirect one, which enable receipt by the parties and their candidates to the elected office

¹ *Tajikistan: Clampdown on civil society*. The Worldwide Human Rights Movement. <https://www.fidh.org/en/issues/human-rights-defenders/tajikistan-clampdown-on-civil-society> (2017, September, 20).

² Науразова, Э. Причины, формы и последствия политической коррупции в Таджикистане. *Интернаука*. <<https://internetnauka.com/index.php/journal/article/view/177>> (2017, June, 12).

³ Давлат, Н. Таджикистан: коррупция решает все. *Media group Tajikistan Asia-plus*. <http://cabar.asia/ru/nurali-davlat-tadzhikistan-korruptsiya-reshaet-vse/?upm_export=pdf> (2017, July, 31).

⁴ Мамадазимов, А., Куватова, А. (2011). *Регулирование деятельности политических партий и участие женщин в политической жизни в Таджикистане*, Душанбе, 49.

possibility of acquiring some services for lowered prices or free¹. Indirect financing in Tajikistan foresees equal access to state media and creating equal possibilities for parties in electoral campaign production. The Article 15 of the Law “On political parties” describes the limits of the state support of the parties: 1) providing equal access to state media; 2) providing equal possibilities for electoral campaign conduction². Absence of direct state financing makes them seek alternative sources of financing and, in most cases, become dependent on sponsors. Thus, according to the Article 13 of the Law “On political parties”, parties have right “to accept financial help in form of property and financial means from physical persons, enterprises and organizations, public associations, funds and other legal non-state entities”.

It is necessary to emphasize, that modern world democratic tendencies certify implementation of state financing of parties. Instead, in Tajikistan political parties have access only to state bank account, which is open for the period of election campaign; moreover, this account is being monitored continuously. As a result, such donation system does not work, as citizens do not want to disclose their personal party preferences. Moreover, such donations may cause negative consequences to the donators (those who supported opposition parties) themselves. Repressions towards sponsors regularly appear in veiled form, for example, revocation of a license of an entrepreneur, etc.

In general, co-existence of official legal and institutional organizations with parallel network of interpersonal relations of the family-clan and feudal-client nature, determining public and business relations characterizes states of Central Asia, and in particular, Tajikistan. The corruption level does not reduce because of imperfectness of legislation, wrong personnel policy, lack of public and parliamentary control. Efficiency of anti-corruption fights depends on generation change – political corruption will reduce, if a new generation will be brought up in appropriate pluralistic culture, not tolerating corruption. Success of fight against corruption is probably the most dependent on political will of people holding the office. Political will of the first person, leader of the state, who in spirit of traditions should become an example for all co-citizens, decides everything in such state as Tajikistan.

In general, in all Central Asian states, political corruption is systematic. It has deeply penetrated not only into the state apparatus, but also in the legal, institutional and cultural environment³. “Party activity is saturated with corruption; lobbyist practices are deprived of a civilized format. “Instead of acceptance of democratic ideals and market mechanisms as priority methods to achieve economic prosperity and political stability which is supported by West, Central Asia faced restriction of its development by authorities, accumulated by authoritarian regimes, oligarchs and criminal”⁴.

The following conclusion from studying experience of fight against political corruption in the presented group of Asian states may be done: to minimize political corruption, the will and steady sequencing is necessary, as well as a personal positive example of the higher state leadership. Experience of the analysed states demonstrates that strict authoritarian methods bring quite quick results, but despite all anti-sociality of corruption actions they contradict the democratic tradition and respect for human rights. Search of optimal ways to fight political corruption continues and the methods are constantly being modified under the influence of the latest challenges.

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¹ Walecki, M. (2009). Practical Solution for Spending Limits. In M. Ohman and H. Zainulbhai (Eds.). *Political Finance Regulation: The Global Experience*. Washington, IFES, 43–53.

² Закон Республики Таджикистан «О политических партиях». База данных «Законодательство стран СНГ». <http://base.spinform.ru/show_doc.fwx?rgn=78400> (2017, September, 14).

³ Макаренко, Т. Центральна Азія: де зіткнулися сила, політика і економіка. *The North Atlantic Treaty Organization*. <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2009/Asia/central_asian_geopolitics/UK/index.htm> (2017, September, 20)

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