

THEORY OF JUDGMENT IN THE LVOV SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY: INTRODUCTION TO RESEARCH

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Current knowledge of philosophical and logical investigations includes numerous gaps regarding the theory of judgment in the Lvov School of Philosophy. The aim of the paper is to show that the task of filling this gap is not without merit and to outline the way how to complete this task.

Theoretical and methodological roots of theory of judgement of the Lvov School in philosophy lies in philosophy of Franz Brentano, whose views on logic have been identified as the first ever revolt against Aristotelian logic. This fact increases the theoretical and practical value of attainments in the theory of judgement of the School as one of the most potent centers of Brentano's philosophy, and justifies the necessity to scrutinize and systematize them. In turn, taking into consideration the fact that for specific interpretations of judgement in the School there were mainly innovative constructions of logic, conducting such a study seems to be crucial not only from the historical point of view (as the reconstruction of an important period of history of Polish philosophy and logic in Lvov) but also can provide plenty of interesting issues and serve as the source of inspiration for contemporary logic and meta-logic research.

Therefore the way how to complete the task of the paper is like following: (1) to reconstruct a full range of theoretical propositions in the theory of judgment devised in the Lvov School; (2) to explicate epistemic and ontic foundations of theoretical propositions of the School and (3) to find, analytically develop, and introduce to science so far unknown scientific materials (dissertations, readings and academic lectures, correspondences, etc.).

Key words: The Lvov School of Philosophy, theory of judgment, research.

ТЕОРІЯ СУДЖЕННЯ У ЛЬВІВСЬКІЙ ФІЛОСОФСЬКІЙ ШКОЛІ: ВСТУП ДО ДОСЛІДЖЕННЯ

Степан Іванік

Сучасний стан досліджень наукової спадщини львівської філософської школи має численні прогалини, однією з яких є теорія судження цієї школи. Показано важливість завдання заповнення цієї прогалини і окреслено шлях виконання цього завдання.

Ключові слова: львівська філософська школа, теорія судження, дослідження.

Current state of knowledge. The range of research on the theory of judgment in the Lvov School shall be considered in terms of the state of research on the Warsaw-Lvov School, since the Lvov School was its integral part.

There is no gainsaying the fact that the most advanced research on the Lvov School legacy (as the integral part of Warsaw-Lvov School) is conducted in Poland where, within the last seven decades (from 1945 and currently), hundreds of dissertations and articles regarding both various aspects and particular representatives of the School have been published. It is worth listing the most popular, that is the following: S. Zamecki, *Koncepcja nauki w Szkole Lwowsko-Warszawskiej*, Wrocław 1977; J. Woleński, *Filozoficzna*

Szkola Lwowsko-Warszawska, Warszawa 1985; J. Czerny, *Kazimierz Twardowski – współtwórca brentanowskiego programu filozofii*, Wrocław–Warszawa–Kraków 1990; R. Jadcak, *Kazimierz Twardowski – twórca Szkoły Lwowsko-Warszawskiej*, Toruń 1991; J. Woleński, *Szkola Lwowsko-Warszawska w polemikach*, Warszawa 1997; R. Jadcak, *Mistrz i jego uczniowie*, Warszawa 1997; J. Jadacki, *Orientacje i doktryny filozoficzne*, Warszawa 1998; T. Rzepa, *Życie psychiczne i drogi do niego: (psychologiczna Szkoła Lwowska)*, Szczecin 1998; J. Jadacki, *Recent Polish Philosophy*, Warszawa 2009; R. Murawski, *Filozofia matematyki i logiki w Polsce międzywojennej*, Toruń 2011.

In Poland works of the major representatives of the School are periodically published; these include the

following figures: Kazimierz Twardowski, Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, Jan Łukasiewicz, Tadeusz Czeżowski, Tadeusz Kotarbiński, Władysław Tatarkiewicz and others, and the tradition of the School is maintained in works of the contemporary Polish philosophers (Anna Brożek, Andrzej Grzegorzczak, Jacek Jadacki, Jan Woleński, Arkadiusz Chrudzinski and others).

Apart from Poland, the vast part of the legacy of the Warsaw-Lvov School belongs to western countries (J. Cavallin. *Psychologism in philosophy: Edmund Husserl, Kazimierz Twardowski and intentional objects*, Stockholm 1987; P. Simons. *Philosophy and Logic in Central Europe from Bolzano to Tarski*, Dordrecht 1992; F. Coniglione. *Polish scientific philosophy: the Lvov-Warsaw School*, Amsterdam-Atlanta 1993; K. Kijania-Placek, J. Woleńskiegi (eds.), *The Lvov-Warsaw School and Contemporary Philosophy*, Dordrecht-Boston 1998; S. Lapointe, J. Wolenski, M. Marion (eds.), *The Golden Age of Polish Philosophy: Kazimierz Twardowski's Philosophical Legacy* Dordrecht: Springer 2009; K. Szaniawski (ed.), *The Vienna Circle and the Lvov-Warsaw School*, Dordrecht/Boston/London 1989) Russia (W. Wasiukow (red.), *Философия и логика Львовско-Варшавской школы*, Moskwa 1999; W. Wasiukow, *Исследования аналитического наследия Львовско-Варшавской школы*, Sankt-Petersburg 2006) and Ukraine (B. Dąbrowski, *Львівсько-Варшавська філософська школа (1895-1939)*, Lwów 2004, S. Ivanyk, *Степан Олексюк – учень Казимежа Твардовського*, Lwów 2012). Furthermore, translations of works of the main representatives of the School are published in western languages and Russian, whereas at the University in Trento (Italy), as well as in Saint Petersburg (Russia) there are special research centers of its scientific legacy.

Problem statement. However, in spite of such considerable and constantly enlarging literature devoted to the Warsaw-Lvov School, hitherto there has not been any comprehensive study on development of logic and its philosophical foundations – regarding the theory of judgment in particular – in the Lvov branch of the School. It is only the theory of judgment by the founder and the Master of this School - Twardowski – that has been multiply analytically developed (yet not comprehensively) by Polish and Western researchers (e.g. E. Paczkowska-Łagowska, *O naturze sądów według Twardowskiego*, [in:] *Psychika i poznanie. Epistemologia K. Twardowskiego*, Warszawa 1980; A. Olech, *Twardowskiego rozróżnienie „czynności” i „wytworów” a różne rozumienia terminu „sąd”* [in:] *Język wyrażenia i znaczenia*, Częstochowa 1993; B. Smith, *Kasimir Twardowski: Sachverhalt vs. Judgment-Content: Immanence and Idealism* [w:] *Austrian Philosophy. The legacy of Franz Brentano*, Illinois 1994; A. Betti, *The Road from Vienna to Lvov. Twardowski's Theory of*

Judgment between 1894 and 1897, “Grazer Philosophische Studien” 67 (2004), p.1-20; M. van der Schaar, *Twardowski on Knowledge, Judgment and Truth* [w:] Horecka, A. (Ed.), *Logic, Methodology & Philosophy of Science 5*, p. 131–141, Warszawa 2009). Far less attention has been paid to analyzing the theory of judgment of the famous Lvov Twardowski's students: Jan Łukasiewicz (regarding his scientific output in Lvov), Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, Stanisław Leśniewski, Tadeusz Kotarbiński, Zygmunt Zawirski, Tadeusz Czeżowski, Władysław Witwicki, Henryk Mehlberg and Leopold Blaustein. However, what shall be underscored, and which has not been included at all, is scientific works in the scope of the whole range of less known (or unknown) students of the Lvov School founder: Daniela Gromska, Walter Auerbach, Marian Borowski, Bogdan Nawroczyński, Stefan Oleksiuk, Stefan Baley, Gabriel Kostelnyk, Milena Rudnicka, Miron Zarycki, Tadeusz Gluziński, Eugeniusz Hłuszkiewicz, Stanisław Kaczorowski, Władysław Hetper, Helena Dubeńska, Tadeusz Witwicki, Franciszek Manthey, Rudolf Nykołajczuk-Nałęcki, Pepi Spinner, Fryderyka Schrenzel, Franciszek Smolka, Irena Jawicówna, Adam Stögbauer, Waclaw Wolski, Salomon Igel and others.

One of the major reasons for such insufficient state of knowledge of the theory of judgment in the Lvov School seems to be the common conviction that logic was primary for the Warsaw branch of the Warsaw-Lvov School, at the time when the Lvov branch dealt mainly with psychology, and conducted in this center logic research was “infected” with the anachronistic psychologism and, quoting Roman Ingarden, they were utterly “barren”, that is not worth paying special attention by researchers.

Another vital cause of such circumstances can be found when considering a very difficult access to the scientific legacy of the School by Polish researchers. The thing is that works of the majority of the aforementioned representatives of the School, which are essential for reconstruction of the theory of judgment in the School, or which were printed in insignificant quantities in publishing companies or Lvov magazines in the years 1894-1918, are currently hard-to-access antique rarity, or which were not published at all, and currently are available only as manuscripts and typescripts in various archives in Lvov. Finally, a language barrier appears to be another obstacle when accessing legacy of the School: among representatives of the Lvov School there were also Ukrainians (Stefan Baley, Gabriel Kostelnyk, Stefan Oleksiuk, Milena Rudnicka, Miron Zarycki and others), whose vast number of works were published in Ukrainian.

Aim of the paper. As we saw above, although the number of works concerning the Lvov-Warsaw School (1895–1939) is gradually increasing, the scope of

research is still incomplete. In particular, the current knowledge of philosophical and logical investigations includes numerous gaps regarding the theory of judgment in Lvov branch of the School, most notably in a very significant period of 1894–1918 when its theoretical and methodological foundations were laid. The aim of the paper is therefore (1) to show that the task of filling this gap is not without merit and (2) to outline the way how to complete this task.

Importance of the research. The question “What is judgment?” has exercised generations of philosophers. In description of one of the last comprehensive research of the issue, work under the title “Judgment and Truth in Early Analytic Philosophy and Phenomenology” (ed. Mark Textor, Palgrave Macmillan: 2013) we can read that “The prevalent view of judgment in late Modern philosophy was the idea that judgment is the synthesis of representations into a unity. The synthesis model of judgment proved to be highly influential. Idealists on the Continent and in Britain conceived of judgment as a unifying act. However, the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century saw a major change in the theory of judgment. Early analytic philosophers such as Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein as well as phenomenologists such as Brentano, Husserl and Reinach changed how philosophers think about judgment” [45]. Let us remember that it was the very period when the Lvov School of philosophy appeared. As known it’s founder and Master – prominent Polish philosopher Kazimierz Twardowski came to Lvov in 1894 from the capital of the Austro-Hungarian Empire – Vienna – the city where he was born, graduated from gymnasium, and studied philosophy at the university, mainly under a supervision of Franz Brentano. Twardowski working in the Lvov School believed to be the follower of his Viennese master and endeavored to create one of the centers of Brentano’s philosophical thought in Lvov. In his autobiography he wrote in this regard: “I felt called to bring my people a philosophy, what I learned from Franz Brentano, especially to introduce the academic youth into the spirit and method of this philosophy” [46, p. 29]. In this way, Lvov became along with Vienna, Graz, Prague and other cities one of the powerful centers of philosophical tradition stemming from Brentano – so called brentanism.

This fact leads to the search for theoretical and methodological roots of theory of judgment of the Lvov School in philosophy of Brentano, whose views on logic have been identified by Władysław Tatarkiewicz as the first ever revolt against Aristotelian logic [144, p. 160]. The sense of this “revolt” consisted in a completely different from Aristotle understanding of essence of judgment: namely Brentano questioned the Aristotelian understanding of judgment as a combination of two presentations, recognizing that the essence of judgments

is acceptance or refusal of an object. Later on, Twardowski in his lecture “The idio- and allogenetic theories of judgment” (1907) described the Aristotelian theory of judgment as “allogenetic” and the Brentano’s theory of judgment – as “idiogenetic”, opting for the latter and proposing some modification of it. This modification consisted in taking to account of distinction between content and object of mental acts (including acts of judgment) made by Twardowski in work “On the content and object of presentation” (1894). According to the aforementioned distinction, Twardowski argued that the object of the judgment is that the existence of what is stated or denied in judgment, and the content of judgment is existence or non-existence which is attributed to the object of the judgment. Thus, the essence of the judgment by Twardowski is a statement or rejection of the content of judgment, that is the existence of its object.

The theory of judgment developed by Brentano and then creatively modified by Twardowski is undoubtedly the element of the whole doctrine of the analytical trend, thanks to which the interest in their works has been on the increase for dozen years. The value of their theories of judgment is concerned with the following:

First of all, back then it was something new when compared to previously existing tradition (quoting Władysław Tatarkiewicz: “It was the first rebellion against Aristotle’s logic after the long period of time” [144, p. 160]);

Secondly, the theory of judgment served as the basis for new interpretation of the Aristotle’s logic represented by Brentano and his followers.

Without a shadow of a doubt, a forte of this theory of judgment is being holistic, which consists in on the one hand matching logic, epistemic and ontic statements which act in favor of the proposed theory, and – on the other hand – being able to consider issues coherently with the theory of preliminary subjects – in particular the theory of presentation, name and object. Therefore, Brentano’s followers do not get engaged into the problem of tautology of positive existential judgment, and contradiction of negative existential judgments.

Consequently, a number of valuable ideas of Brentano’s supporters are related either directly to the theory of judgment, or to its widely understood foundations. Brentano and Twardowski were capable of demonstrating, firstly, why functionally judgment is individual category and the one which does not derive from any other, and – secondly - why it is judgment that provides basic knowledge information. A considerable systematic value has Brentano’s arguments, directed against the classical theory of predicative judgments. One needs to pay special attention to the fact that Brentano’s and Twardowski’s analyses show that

considering certain problems – especially ontological – can occur within considering the structure and elements of judgment.

The aforementioned points increase the theoretical and practical value of attainments in the theory of judgment of the Lvov School of philosophy as one of the most potent centers of Brentano's theory, and justifies the necessity to scrutinize and systematize them. In turn, taking into consideration the fact that for specific interpretations of judgment in the School there were mainly innovative constructions of logic, conducting such a study seems to be crucial not only from the historical point of view (as the reconstruction of an important period of history of Polish philosophy and logic in Lvov) but also can provide plenty of interesting issues and serve as the source of inspiration for contemporary logic and meta-logic research. It seems that results of the research will be of interest for anyone working on epistemology, ontology, analytic philosophy, philosophy of mind, psychology and, forasmuch theories of judgment attempt to describe the mind processes that take place when human being make decisions and choices in everyday life, these results could be also applicable in non-philosophical areas as diverse as economics, sociology, theology, mathematics (probability) and politics.

Research plan. All the above facts give reason for hypotheses, that the Lvov School of philosophy presented (1) a considerable and uniform intellectual formation, whose theoretical axe was original theory of judgment, and (2) a laboratory of thought, discussion centre, which provided a number of valuable (but for many reasons frequently neglected or underestimated) for the science of the Polish and international philosophical and logic ideas, particularly within the theory of judgment.

A special attention would be drawn to the role of polemical tradition within the Lvov School (for example the following disputes: “Łukasiewicz-Smolka”, “Wolski-Witwicki”, “Leśniewski-Kotarbiński”), which substantially contributed to emergence of original theories in the field of theory of judgment and logic. Among the most interesting issues, considered in works of the representatives of the School, which will be subject to critical analysis and creative development, would be *inter alia* the following:

1. Relation of judgment and other classes of mental acts (performances and volitional acts).
2. Is judgment included in perception?
3. Differentiation between judgment in terms of logic and judgment in terms of psychology.
4. Relations between judgment and its expression in natural language (sentence).
5. Is existence a content of judgment?
6. Is existence a predicate of judgment?

7. The matter of relation between truth and existence, and false and non-existence.

8. Significance of change of view of the essence of judgment for the theory of understanding.

Realization of the goals of such a research will be concerned with systematic development of (a) critical literature regarding the theory of judgment and (b) source literature (published and non-published). A distinctive feature of the study would be to put much effort into finding, analyzing and introducing non-published works of the representatives of the Lvov School into science, since it is fundamental to assume that in Lvov archives one can find a number of valuable manuscripts for the Polish intellectual legacy, development of which is indispensable for the fully valuable reconstruction of the theory of judgment and logic in the Lvov School. What renders the proposed assumption legitimate are the following: (1) archival discoveries by the Ukrainian philosophers from the late XX century or fixed in their works references to precious materials of the representatives of the School, with which Polish researchers are unfamiliar, and (2) results of the conducted reviews of the archival resources of Lvov by the author of the given project in the years 2009–2012.

Ad (1) It is primarily concerned with archival materials of Twardowski, which were not provided to Poland by Lvov University after the Second World War and have remained in Lvov up to the present day. Polish researchers learned about them *via* works of Ukrainian philosophers, which quoted works by Twardowski in their oeuvre (e.g. professor Marat Vernikov in his article *Философские взгляды К. Твардовского [Philosophical views of K. Twardowski]* [52] mentions the whole collection, located in archives of the Library of the Ivan Franko National University of Lvov, of manuscripts of academic lectures by Twardowski. One of these lessons – *Preliminary lecture at Lvov University from 15 November 1895* – was published by the author shortly after the above-mentioned article, and in Poland published after 17 years [51]. Marat Vernikov in his manuscripts mentioned, exceptionally critical for analysis of the theory of judgment of Twardowski, his lecture from 1899/1900 entitled *Reformative tendencies within formal logic*, which inspired *inter alia* Łukasiewicz who eventually got involved in the formal logic. Unfortunately, this manuscript and many other important texts by Twardowski have not been found so far. Yet, in the nineties in Polish magazines there were also other materials by Twardowski, found in Lvov archives (e.g. *Philosophical Autobiography* [46] and *Theory of Judgments* (unfinished text) [50]).

Ad (2) On the basis of the conducted archival queries in Lvov by the author of the project, it was possible to fix existence of a number of materials in Lvov archives (including manuscripts, typescripts of

unpublished dissertations, MA and PhD theses, seminar essays, lessons, lectures, correspondences, etc.), which shed new light on the theory of judgment both of K. Twardowski and his vast array of students: Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, Walter Auerbach, Stefan Błachowski, Izodora Dąbmska, Jan Łukasiewicz, Henryk Mehlberg, Rudolf Nykołajczuk-Nałęcki, Helena Słoniewska, Franciszek Smolka, Tadeusz Tomaszewski, Stefan Baley, Stefan Ołeksiuk, Milena Rudnicka, Miron Zarycki and others. Thousands of pages have been found so far. One has to list manuscripts of unknown lessons by Twardowski and Ajdukiewicz regarding logic delivered at Lvov University, unpublished works by Łukasiewicz and Smolka, doctoral dissertations and scientific lectures (also unpublished) by Ajdukiewicz, Auerbach, Mehlberg etc.

Therefore, the research plan assumed in the given article can be defined as follows:

1. Conducting a detailed review of Polish publishers and scientific magazines from the end of XIX – early decades of XX century, in which were works of the representatives of the Lvov School regarding the theory of judgment. Selection and analytical development of the found materials.

2. Conducting detailed queries of Lvov archives, selection and digital copying of the most valuable materials of the representatives of the Lvov School with regard to the theory of judgment (for this purpose 6 scientific trips (each with the length of approximately 1 month) to Lvov during 2014–2015 are planned). Selection and analytical development of materials which were and will be found.

Considering the specific nature of the research, realization of particular tasks at every stage will require application of diverse methods: (1) in order to explore and settle archival documents, general methods of archival work will be used; (2) in order to develop analytically studied materials, a typical method for strictly historical analysis of correspondence and autobiography documents will be used on the one hand, and on the other – typical in philosophical studies – reconstruction of logic and philosophical views included in maintained source texts, enriched with critical development of issues included in it, as well as comparative juxtaposition of issues included in texts with fixed views on logic and meta-logic thoughts of the Warsaw-Lvov School.

Conclusion. The major aim of the research on theory of judgment in the Lvov School of philosophy is therefore (1) to reconstruct a full range of theoretical propositions in the theory of judgment devised in the Lvov School; (2) to explicate epistemic and ontic foundations of theoretical propositions of the School and (3) to find, analytically develop, and introduce to science so far unknown scientific materials (dissertations,

readings and academic lectures, correspondences, etc.) of the representatives of the Lvov School. Thus, the research aims to outline both historical and analytical context of the aforementioned propositions, which will allow on the one hand to highlight the significant and specific aspects of the theory of judgment in the Lvov School, and on the other hand – indicate important and current for the contemporary science elements of the above-mentioned theory. This means that the study is of paramount importance both with respect to history and theory.

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