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PERFORMATIVE NORMATIVITY IN EPISTEMOLOGY AND ETHICS

Епістемологія, вчення про те, що ми знаємо і як ми це знаємо, так само як і етика, вчення про те як ми маємо вчиняти, залучають нормативність. Нормативність можна зрозуміти як перформаційну. Важливі концепти зазначених філософських дисциплін, такі як знання, обґрунтування, дія, виявляються авто-перформаційними. Їх статус стандартний, а їх зміст відносний контексту здійснення. Релятивізм не є загрозливим, адже є преформаційним, а тому – релятивним, стосується змісту, а не статусу концептів. Дискусія про "буденний погляд на диспут про схильності" між П. Богоссіаном, К. Райтом і ЖС Белом, а також погляди на деякі епістемологічні проблеми С. Шеленберг і Е. Барнс розглянуті в статті задля ілюстрації і прояснення запропонованого підходу.

Ключові слова: нормативність, епістемологія, етика, практична філософія, філософія дії, філософія активності, перформаційнйість, знання, обґрунтування, моральність, екстерналізм, інтерналізм.

In this elaboration, first I am going to speak about epistemology, ethics, justification and normativity in general perspective of practical philosophy (philosophy of action), to provide a broader background of the conception and understanding of these issues that seems more fruitful. Secondly, I involve the positions of P. Boghossian, C. Wright and JC Beall on the 'ordinary view of dispute of inclinations' with the aim, rather, to briefly compare some of their points in a way that would help me to clarify my views. Then I bring attention to the papers by S. Schellenberg 'Experience and Evidence' and by E. Barnes 'Emergence and Fundamentality' to interpret them in a way that supports my view.

Epistemic justification traditionally concerns propositional knowledge and is problematic in all its main versions of externalist and internalist approaches (foundationalism, coherentism, reliabilism). Justification of knowledge supplies its certainty, which is essential for its status. Certainty as a feature of knowledge excludes the possibility of mistake (falsehood), doubting and lack of justification. At the same time neither knowledge no its proper characteristics such as justification, truth or certainty, are intended to be taken a priory, necessary etc.

Moral justification traditionally concerns our actions, and how to provide it remains to be ambiguous both externally and internally. Justification of actions supplies their right to be done, institutionalizes them. Morality is a field of common laws; Moral is a field of moral laws. The latter appears to be a special case of the previous, thus – not a priory. Nevertheless, we lack the satisfactory hierarchy or even clarified enough relations between mentioned epistemological and moral issues. Such lack brings into doubt the adequacy and fruitfulness of traditional methodological starting points, gives reason to find alternative ways to deal with the mentioned issues.

The general background of investigation goes in accordance with such philosophical transformations as linguistic, pragmatic and conceptual turns, which show complementary character of theoretical and practical reasons. I advocate practical philosophy as a special philosophical perspective that involves different philosophical fields (both practical and theoretical, traditionally considered to be separate). Epistemology and Ethics (Moral Philosophy) enter the thematic sphere of Practical Philosophy; their topics could get an appropriate treatment under the perspective of the last.

Practical philosophy presupposes analysis of how do we know of 'what there is' in the perspective of its realization (accomplishment). Thus it is not only knowledge of 'what there is' but also about 'how it is there'. These questions could be considered in terms of practice rather then in terms of unshakable eternal ground. Activity constitutes being; what do our actions involve (including the agent himself, external items, regulative issues) is not given, but gets its establishment by being at least actualized, if not constituted or even created (composed), by our intention to do these actions (externally), and, what is more important (internally), from inside of accomplishing the actions.

Thus 'what there is' cannot be available in advance, but is actualized by our activity. We gain knowledge of 'what there is' from inside of being active, accomplishing an action. This knowledge cannot be only propositional; it contains the know-how aspect as well as 'knowledge by acquaintance' aspect. These three levels of knowledge of 'what there is' ought not to be separated; and 'what there is' *exists*, *is dealt with* and *appears* simultaneously. Knowledge of 'What there is' is demonstrative, self-performative via agent's activity.

Epistemology is the study of how to know of what there is in the world, it involves normative relationship between the researcher and the world. Ethics is the study of how to act or what shall we do, it involves normative relationship between the actors and their actions.

The following is a relevant background of understanding of normativity. Normativity as a general feature of philosophical approaches to a particular topic is devoted to provide and regulate the order of items which are included into it. Normative character of an approach appears when it intends to purposefully regulate items thematically covered by it. Such directing and regulating realized via generating what norms, rules, tasks, etc. standards of an investigation under the approach ought to be. Norms condition the character of particular rules established to constitute and maintain the order. The significance of norms is not universal in general but relevant to the scope of the approach they are appropriate to constitute and regulate. At the same time within a particular investigative scope the significance of norms and their force is 'universal'. Norms obviously are not facts, they are not about 'what there is' but about 'how something ought to be'. Norms are not values, but provide values (such as good and bad; right and wrong; true and false), they provide the way of evaluating and concluding about or prescribing values. Very important of norms is their constitutive character (or even function), regulative is also important, but constitutive has priority. That corresponds to practical internal implicit features of norms in my account. These features underline relation between a norm and what is constituted and regulated by it. It could be a particular type of utterance expressing token proposition of some moral or epistemic content.

In epistemology one examines how the world could be captured in terms of knowledge. We perceive events of the world participating in them. Such experience provides us with evidence of 'what there is in the world' and 'how it is there'. We gain knowledge on this evidence, where 'what' and 'how' come together.

If we do not separate the propositional knowledge from 'knowledge-how' and 'knowledge by acquaintance',

knowledge could be understood as self-performative. Justification could be treated in terms of self-justification (auto-justification) when what is said cannot avoid to be accomplished.

Knowledge is self-performative, when what is considered in the status of knowledge (a content) performs itself as such when we turn or appeal to it, and we cannot avoid dealing with this content paying attention to its very status of knowledge (and all of the mentioned earlier features of it). Then, we could challenge the status of being knowledge of a content and even reject such a status. So, what is a particular content that has a status of knowledge is relative, but the status itself is tried to be reserved standardly and normatively and not relatively.

Relativism challenges normativity of philosophical elaborations. Nevertheless that methodologically relativism is questionable and not acceptable when it is directed in general to everything at all (then relativism would turn to itself and relativize itself, thus it would reject its own generality and appears to be local, and I find it fine – relativism is itself relative), it is not avoidable in some particular fields (approaches) that involve normativity, for example about epistemic and moral justification. Relativism itself appears to be performative: relativism is relative!

To understand a content in the status of knowledge it should be self-performative in this status, correspond and maintain, thus perform, accomplish, realize characteristics of this status. It could be supplied if we do not separate the propositional knowledge from 'knowledge-how' and 'knowledge by acquaintance', and I claim of these modes as complementary and reciprocally connected.

Justification could be treated in terms of performative self-justification (auto-justification) when what is stated cannot avoid to be accomplished. Such utterances are performative. As an example, the expressions that can be done only by the Ist person can be brought into; they can be about our direct experience, accomplished experience of the self. Such experience cannot be invalid; we can experience, for example percept, mistakenly (illusion) or falsely (hallucination); we can incorrectly identify experience or wrongly articulate about it; but experience evidences itself. Making such utterances does not presuppose special intuition or state of consciousness, we can directly express experienced, and used to it in an ordinary way of life. The content of these expressions realizes itself, this supplies their truth and justification, excludes possibility to doubt them. There is no need in any further tool for their justification. What is said by it is accomplished, realized; what is stated by it makes it to be done; such expression is a condition of possibility of its making (saying, realizing). Thus, each of them is always true, its content is knowledge. But, the content by itself is not necessary true, its realization is necessary true. What is stated by it could not be possible to say, if it was not the case.

Descartes' 'Cogitoergosum' can be example of self-justification. 'I exist' is not a consequence of 'I think'. They are not logical truth and are independent of each other. They are similar (as A. Ayer mentions in his 'The Problem of knowledge' [7]; by the way J. Hintikka also gave a kind of such treating of Descatres' Cogito once in 60s [12] and in 90s [13]), to pointing gestures or exclamations, they explicate implicitly obvious issues, so their deliberate expressing entails corresponding context. The content of such sentences does not say much. 'I exist' does not describe how I exist. The possibility of saying it is just a case; it just happened that the speaker who says it exists. It just happened that I exist; I say about it, I am justified and certain in doing it. The fact that I think is analogous. My saying 'I think' evidences for me my self-recognition, self-consciousness; mind at once is aware of itself; my saying 'I exist' evidences for me my own existence.

Each of these statements cannot be said falsely. Any speaker sensitive to rational correct using of words is not capable to express a sentence 'I exist' or 'I think' to make a false proposition. They have performative, ostensive character. Their using accomplishes their content. Because 'I think' or 'I exist' are not descriptions, we cannot be mistaken or false when utter them. But, the remaining difficulty is that they do not say much. But I believe such performative self-realizing character can appear in other cases as well, even when it's not the Ist person who utters them. Some of them are cases that involve knowledge, some – morality. More broadly, every linguistic expression has performative character, might be illocutive or perlocutuve, even descriptions are not locutionary, but are illocutionary.

Nevertheless it seems obvious that self-justifying by their realization contents (more general, the fact that some contents work) are recognized from the 'ordinary view of dispute of inclinations'. They can play the role of foundation for epistemic and moral justification as samples. That would preserve the normativity of philosophical analyses of epistemic justification in a transformed toward relativism way.

The term 'ordinary view of dispute of inclinations' can be met in discussions between P. Boghossian [10], C. Wright [16] and JC Beall [9]. Boghossian brings into analyses issues about morality and epistemic justification. Both of these fields supposed to have normative character.

The discussion between Boghossian, Wright and Beall goes around whether some contradicting propositions can or cannot be faultless *under a coherent theory*. Boghossian denies this while the others propose to consider some possible interpretations under the 'ordinary view of dispute of inclinations'. Contradicting propositions that are contents of opinions, tastes or inclinations can be faultless. They are asserted and maintained by their bearers. 'Ordinary view of dispute of inclinations' can be understood as a part of conceiving morality. In Wright's article the 'ordinary view of dispute of inclinations' is described as such that it is possible and often it is the case that strictly speaking excluding one another positions are rationally maintained and are not mistaken simultaneously.

Then there remains the instance of epistemic justification if it is possible to reserve faultlessness in question in this case. If it is, it would also involve the topic of truth and certainty. Beall insists that relativism under discussion can even be consistent with correspondence about truth: truthfulness of contents is due to the correspondence with the way 'the world is', but recognition of 'how it is' is relative.

To go into some further details of their discussion, lets remember that Boghossian allows coherent relativism, but not about elaborations in philosophy and in most of science or rather in methodology of science. Such coherent relativism forbids (assertion of) absolute facts and propositions that express them, significances (values) of both facts and propositions are limited, are relative. Thus, the author would agree that morality is relative, but it cannot be relative as a topic of philosophical analysis. Let's take the mentioned limitations to be entailed by a striving to preserve normative character of philosophy and methodology of

science. But we claim that even epistemic justification enters the 'ordinary view of dispute of inclinations'.

L. Wittgenstein (at least in his latter works [15]) saw clarification of language's meanings as the task of philosophy as therapy. Clarification (like treatment) eliminates (cures of) philosophical problems. It can be applied to Epistemology as well as to Moral Philosophy (Ethics). Then in these fields we could analyze what we ought to do (how we are to act), what is good or bad, what is knowledge (and connected with is topics), epistemic and moral judgments in general by analyzing and clarifying how we make them, how we say about these issues. Nevertheless we could remain to be in the field of Ethics without reducing it into Meta-ethics or naturalizing it into the Theory of Meaning or Philosophy of Language or even Philosophy of Mind. Analogously, no reduction is in need with in the case of Epistemology.

Content is constituted by being uttered; it does not precede the speech act of its realization. To say meaningfully, to mean is to perform (actualize or do) the intended content. Such realization witnesses the validity or invalidity of what has been said. 'What' coincides with 'How'. When utterance has 'ought' form its vagueness or seeming confusion is due to disparity of how one is able to (and is going to) act and how he says about it. The *relation* between this pair should be internal. When it is not obvious and confusing (mostly and commonly it is), one appeals to external regularities to rely on them. They could work successfully in motivating to take obligation and to accomplish it, or to judge and give evaluation and further make it institutional etc. Then the mentioned relation appears to be external, and the productive achievement (performing action, making satisfactory conclusion etc.) is just a matter of luck.

Speaking of 'oughtness' involves internalist and externalist relations (in other words normativity provides constitutive and regulative functions correspondingly): the relation between *this mode (way) of speaking* and *its particular involved content*, and between *the latter (particular involved content)* and the *speaker himself*. Saying is acting because it is accomplishing of content. Each relation can be both internal and external; one feature should not exclude another. Such not-exclusiveness concerns this pair of relational characteristics in general, not only with regards to ethical expressions.

I now appeal to the Richard M. Hare's paper "Internalism and Externalism in Ethic" [11]. He differentiates the use of these terms, internalism and externalism, in ethics and in the theory of meaning. He maintains that moral judgment in internalist sense, sincerely motivates toward action in accordance with it, in externalist sense there is no such motivation. If what the uttered words mean is not affected by external factors, but solely by how the speaker uses words, then they mean internally (towards the speaker), otherwise – externally. He defends internalist moral judgments that motivate and oblige to acting. I take it then that moral utterances, when sense bearing and working, cannot avoid being performances. And the same applies to the statements with the purpose of epistemic justification.

Schellenberg S. [14] aims to establish a unified account of perceptual evidence on the basis of rational perceptual experience. She takes perceptual experience to be a rational source for both kinds of evidence: phenomenal and factive.

From my side I claim that perceptual experience is activity that unifies two interconnected counterparts: sense perception and interpretation (the minimum of which is attention, the maximum – self-consciousness).

Schellenberg agrees with internalists that experience directly provides us with at least some evidence regardless of whether we are adequately perceiving, falsely hallucinating, or suffering a distortive illusion. But the author stresses that when we accurately perceive we have better evidence than we would have from other mentioned kinds of experience.

She associates her approach with externalists to some extends, but disagrees with their stating (as she takes it) that the root of introspective evidence is only hallucination but not a direct experience.

Phenomenal and factive evidence are distinct and the distinction corresponds to two levels of perceptual content. Perceptual experience is individuated as a content type or a content token. Phenomenal evidence is traced back to employment of perceptual capacities and is content type. Factive evidence is traced back to particular employing these capacities in an environment and is content token. Phenomenal and factive evidences provide a unified account of perceptual evidence; they are epistemically united. Both of them involve mental states constituted by the same perceptual capacities. I think this view supports crucial role for knowing of what I called 'knowledge by acquaintance'.

Barnes E. [8] takes emergence as a metaphysical thesis: the prospect of emergent entities (with "entity" being understood as either an object or a property). She analyses meta-ontological tasks in terms of fundamentality and dependence. She builds specific meta-ontological framework to use it as a background for understanding emergence. So, she qualifies fundamental and derivative emergence; ontologically dependent and ontologically independent emergence. This potential separation between fundamentality and independence opens basic characterization of emergence and emergent entities as those which are fundamental but not independent.

About fundamentality she takes it to be a characteristics that excludes having degrees (which will vary inversely with the degree of complexity), everything that is not fundamental simply has its existence derivatively from what exists fundamentally. Such point simplifies but is questionable from my point of view. The content of so-called fundament is never final, we take it to be valid until the further issues are not established or are recognized to be discovered in the status of fundament. Fundamentality can have degrees, but is not the same with dependency.

Ontological dependence is defined by the author in the following way:

An entity x is dependent iff: for all possible worlds w and times t at which a duplicate of x exists, x is accompanied by other contingent objects in w at t;

And she clarifies that ontological dependence is not the dependence of x on the ys. Rather, it's the dependence of x simpliciter. Nothing about dependence encodes the essentiality of constitution. The simples are ontologically independent. If the existence of x does not, at each moment of its existence, rely on some other entity or entities, then x is ontologically independent. The following are examples in terms of ontological dependence (independence) and fundamentality (derivation):

derivative and independent: numbers and necessary abstractions;

derivative and dependent: complex objects, artifacts etc;

fundamental and independent: simples;

fundamental and dependent: emergent entities.

Then Barnes E. defines ontological emergence:

an entity x is ontologically emergent iff: x is fundamental and dependent.

An emergent entity is a substantial ontological commitment. One is ontological committed into emergent things; one is to get them, not for free. At the same time she insists that emergent entities are not very basic building blocks (fundaments) of the world (whatever they may be). Emergent things are not ontologically independent; they depend on the entities from which they emerge. That is, though the emergent entity is 'something new', the existence of the 'new' entity must be both caused *and* sustained by the collective activity of other entities. Otherwise, the entity in question would not be properly characterized as 'emerging' from anything.

So, Barnes elaborations are meta-ontological, are about how to analyze 'what there is in the world'. Epistemology is the study of how to know 'what there is in the world'. So, meta-ontology and epistemology involve 'how' questions. In meta-ontology one examines how the world could be captured in terms of being, true reality; in epistemology one examines how the world could be captured in terms of knowledge (and truth is presupposed as the initial characteristic of knowledge, even if its value is deflated). We perceive events of the world participating in them. Such experience provides us with evidence of 'what there is in the world' and 'how it is there'. We gain knowledge on this evidence, where 'what' and 'how' and its acquaintance by an agent come together.

Nevertheless of a lot of complications, my main attempts were directed to show possibility of performative nature of our utterances with epistemic and moral contents. Such contents appear normative (as it was broadly considered). Thus, I have taken the cases of knowledge and morality, epistemic and moral justification, accomplishing utterances with the corresponding contents. Attention to performativity could provide for their validity, that involves a status, normatively maintained, and a content, that is relative, but relevant to the status only if performative. Content is performative if appropriate to the situation were it appears and accomplishes, thus it is relative. Providing appropriateness involves both internal and external relations between a form of an utterance that expresses a content and this content itself as well as between the speaker and the content.

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ПЕРФОРМАТИВНАЯ НОРМАТИВНОСТЬ В ЭПИСТЕМОЛОГИИ И ЭТИКЕ.

Эпистемология, учение о том, что мы знаем и как мы это знаем, также как и этика, учение о том, как мы должны поступать, носят нормативный характер. Нормативность можно понимать как перформативную. Важные концепты указанных философских дисциплин, такие как знание, обоснование, действие, выявляются авто-перформативными. Их статус стандартный, а их содержание относительно контексту осуществления. Релятивизм не есть порочным, ведь есть преформативным, а потому – релятивным, касается содержания, а не статуса концептов. Дискуссия про "повседневный взгляд на диспут о склонностях" между П. Богоссианом, К. Райтом и ЖС Белом, а также взгляды на некоторые эпистемологические проблемы С. Шеленберг и Э. Барнс рассмотрены в статье для иллюстрации и прояснения предложенного подхода.

Ключевые слова: нормативность, эпистемология, этика, практическая философия, философия действия, философия активности, перформативность, знание, обоснование, моральность, экстернализм, интернализм.

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PERFORMATIVE NORMATIVITY IN EPISTEMOLOGY AND ETHICS

Epistemology, the study of what do we know and how do we know that, as well as Ethics, the study of how shall we act, involve normativity. Normativity could be treated as performative. Important concepts of the mentioned philosophical disciplines, such as knowledge, justification, action, appear to be auto-performative. Their status is standard, but their content is relative to the content of accomplishment. Relativism is not vicious as it is performative, and thus – relative, it concerns a content, but not the status of concepts. The discussion of 'ordinary view of dispute of inclinations' between P. Boghossian, C. Wright and JC Beall, as well as points on some epistemological problems of S. Schellenberg and E. Barnes are brought into the paper to illustrate and clarify the proposed approach.

Keywords: Normativity, Epistemology, Ethics, Practical philosophy, Philosophy of Action, Philosophy of Agency, Performativity, Knowledge, Justification, Morality, Externalism, Internalism.