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## Strengthening EU Defence Capabilities Under Conditions of the Russian-Ukrainian War

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**Abstract.** The issued article describes the military-political dimension of the European Union's activity and its prospects for transformation into a collective security association within the framework of the Russian-Ukrainian war. This topic was the focus of researchers, however, it was considered by them in the context of the history of the European Union and did not involve a separate study. The purpose of this study is to consider the gradation of the defense capability of the European Union in the period from the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian war (2014) to the moment of the full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation into Ukraine (2022) and the prospects for further development of this area within the EU. The basis of methodological basis of the research is a combination of general historical and political science methods, among which retrospective and institutional methods take the leading place. Analytical work with materials and selection of certain works for each of the tasks was accompanied by the use of critical-dialectical, historical-systemic, action, and problem-chronological methods. As a result of the study, it was found that the military component of the defense capability of the European Union consists of the review and development of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), the creation of new defense programs (PESCO), "loyalty programs" (European Partnership Policy) and other possible structures for the emergence of a large security space on the borders with Russia and its satellites. The practical value of the work is revealed in the possibility of using the mentioned facts in the further study of the topic of the development of the defense sphere of the European Union in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, as well as the problems of supranational security formations, in particular on the territory of Europe

**Key words:** European Union, partnership policy, NATO, Global Strategy, European security, defense policy

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### Introduction

The end of November 2013 was notable for the opposition to the attempts of the then Ukrainian leadership represented by V. Yanukovich and the cabinet of M. Azarov to return the state under the yoke of "allied" relations with Russia, while Moscow itself did not even attempt to hide its intentions of economic and political expansion of the Ukrainian territory. The Kremlin calculated that the Ukrainian leadership and military command would be incapable of a qualitative response to military aggression. After the overthrow of the Yanukovich regime, Moscow's plan was implemented during the annexation of Crimea and the invasion of eastern Ukraine in March-April 2014 [1].

Although Russian President Vladimir Putin at the time never decided on a full-scale invasion due to the multilateral agreements – the First Minsk Protocol (often

referred to in the media as "Minsk-1") – the idea was cultivated in the corridors of the Russian power cabins for eight years until the invasion in February 2022 [2].

The Russian military intervention has forced European Union countries to try on the Ukrainian scenario and think about their security, as Brussels has realised that in a new phase of the war with the Ukrainian people, Moscow has launched a plan to return so-called "historical justice", which means that the EU's eastern borders are under threat of military conflicts (At the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union, some countries of the current EU were members of the former, while others had a membership of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, which was established as a counterweight to NATO). In particular, Russia's invasion of Ukraine has disturbed the countries of the Visegrad Group (V4), which includes Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia

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and Hungary. It is particularly relevant to Poland, where Soviet domination after World War II was deeply engraved in the national consciousness of Poles [3]. The situation was similar in the Czech and Slovak Republics, which had once survived the Prague Spring (1956), knowing the value of the Russian “helping hand”. Thus, the European leadership expressed a desire to revise the very concept of the operation of the European Union, which requires modernisation by modern challenges [3].

The above statements define the problems of the research. The subject of the study is the means of strengthening the defence capabilities of the European Union against the background of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The object of the study is the countries of the European Union and their contribution to enhancing the defence capabilities of the EU itself as a monopoly collective entity within modern Europe and its capacity regarding its security. The purpose is to explore the gradation of European Union defence capabilities from the start of the Russo-Ukrainian war (2014) to the moment of a full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine (2022) and the prospects for further developments in this area within the EU.

The available source base is implicitly relevant. In particular, the research by I. Gurak and P. d'Anieri covers the evolution of Russian policy towards Ukraine and examines its modifications and the role of leading figures [4]. A. Chervyatsova's research is significant. It covers the issues of the Russian-Ukrainian war of 2014-2022. In particular, the author explores the specific features of the Minsk Agreements, both in the context of this war and in the context of international law [5]. In a more generalised way, the security aspect of European Union policy was considered in “Refugees, Security and the European Union” by S. Leonard and C. Kohnert [3]. They emphasised the European defence concept but analysed in detail the factors that threaten it. Major trends in the European Union policy are discussed in the book by M. Sini and N. Borrigan “European Union Politics” [6]. The problems of the European Union's security paradigm after Brexit are discussed in detail in the study by S. Paladini and I. Castellucci “European security in a post-Brexit world” [7]. V. Rish, in his study, thoroughly analyses the prerequisites for the Russian-Ukrainian confrontation in early 2014, connected with the factor of the Revolution of Dignity and its perception in the Donbas [8]. And G. Sharafutdinova in her publication described in detail the specifics of the legal legitimisation of Russia's occupation of Crimea and the reflection of this process both in the field of security and in the areas of identity development and international perception [9].

However, notably, the references used do not fully cover the issues dealt with in the study, which first of all distinguishes and highlights the relevance of the research. The scientific novelty is in the analysis of European Union activities designed to strengthen the collective defence capacity of the organisation and use the results in further studies of European policy institutes.

### Materials and Methods

The methodological foundation of the study is a combination of general historical and political science methods, among which the leading place is occupied by retrospective

and institutional. With their help, a structural and functional analysis of the source base was performed, which contributed to the coherent presentation of the material. The theoretical foundation of the study comprises several Western publications of a historiographical, political and military analytical nature, thematically and chronologically covering the activities of the European Union as a coherent subject in the security and defence of its borders.

The research itself was performed in several stages:

The first stage was defined by the preparation of a source base on the three above-mentioned types, which are represented by the works of Western historians, political scientists, military analysts, and other researchers. In processing the sources, a systematic analysis method was used to identify the problem, highlight the purpose, and the relevant main objectives, and identify the relevant literature for the disclosure of all of the above. The content analysis method allowed for structuring the existing body of information according to its purpose and objectives, gathering a list of keywords and the necessary background database. Thus, the selection of the methods mentioned above at this stage of the work resulted in the definition of problems, and purposes, identifying relevance and novelty, and studying and systematising the source base, which helped to organise the work plan.

The second stage was distinguished by its analytical work with materials, the allocation of specific works for each of the objectives, and finally using special historical and political science research methods – critical-dialectical, historical-systemic, action, and problem-chronological. Using the critical-dialectical method in the research has resulted in the identification of the issues of the current European Union in its domestic, foreign policy, and military aspects and in the attitudinal-political background on which the “self-defence strategy” is based. The historical-systemic and action-oriented method helped to analyse the internal situation of the EU as a coherent subject of international relations, to distinguish the varieties of activities designed to ensure defence capability according to the specific organisation, the motivation component of the European leadership, the specifics of implementing particular strategies and plans in line with the challenges. In particular, the problem-chronological method provided background to successful analysis of the source and literature based according to the problem blocks, identifying and systematising the genesis of the issues, and considering them in a strict chronological dimension. Notably, the critical-dialectical and action-oriented methods played a crucial role in this study, which resulted in a qualitative in-depth analysis of the individual spheres of possible influence (pressure) on the enemy: political and military. It entailed an additional definition of the social factor, which in its essence, considered the conditions and motivational component of resource mobilisation. Consequently, the second phase of the study provided background data on the relevant work of the European Union leadership concerning its international bodies in ensuring the organisation's defence capabilities in several dimensions, trends toward internal structural changes at the EU level to ensure effective mobilisation of forces in case of an immediate military threat, and further actions in developing

particular internal and external security institutions of the Union.

The final – the third stage of the study – helped to obtain the results that resulted in the conclusions. At this stage, the method of synthesis of the obtained information was used. These results are the solution to the initially defined objectives and the implementation of the purpose of the study. The conclusions of this study can be used in further research on the European Union and similar supranational entities in the context of the globalisation of the European community.

## Results

The following results were obtained during the study:

1) along with the changing geopolitical situation in Europe, in particular, due to the emergence of new military conflicts on the eastern borders, there has been a return of the ideas of a “united Europe”, which were presented by the EU as the only European geopolitical player on the international scene;

2) due to the war in Ukraine, the European Union began to implement internal transformations in security policy, which gradually resulted in reforms to existing legal and military programs and the emergence of new initiatives that were intended to create the conditions for the establishment of a “defence force”;

3) against the backdrop of the Russian-Ukrainian war, relations between the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO) and the European Union have become closer but are partly competitive.

The annexation of Crimea and the invasion of Donbas in 2014 demonstrated Russia as an immediate threat to the European Union for the first time rather than in theory, although despite everything, the idea of “mutual understanding and cooperation” with the aggressor has not disappeared among European politicians [5]. Anti-Russian policies did prevail in the then EU but were inconsistent: after all, trade and cooperation remained quite strong at many points, as the construction of Nord Stream 2 and the unofficial sale of arms to the Russians after 2014, despite sanctions and embargoes, confirm. Notably, with the start of the full-scale invasion in 2022, several anti-Russian sanctions have been strengthened (Table 1). At the same time, the idea of a “united Europe” was beginning to percolate in the cabinets of European leadership, which essentially represented a model for the development of a coherent political system within the EU and was a kind of “guarantor” of the three key elements on which the European project was initially to be based: a stable security system, economic growth in the Union member states and the positioning of the Union on the international stage as a collective player [10].

However, Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has forced a questioning of the idea's format. While previously it was not even an issue, as the format accommodated the EU of 2013 (after the accession of Croatia), at this stage, the ambitions of the EU, which has seen strong resistance from the Ukrainian people have potentially expanded to Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (after the overthrow of the Lukashenko regime) [11]. This impetus is quite positive and openly promotes the idea that the

“united Europe” has not been implemented, and new integration processes on the part of the “Eastern Partnership” – states are a matter of time.

On the other hand, a new algorithm for conflict warning and prevention was defined in 2014 to quickly anticipate and counteract military conflicts within the EU and in the states bordering it. Having had the painful experience of failed conflict resolution in the Balkans and on Georgian territory in the past, the EU has considered the issue quite seriously. This framework is based on a definition of the risk of conflict, capturing the factors that expose civilians to danger and that undermine the functioning of the state apparatus or the components of the international system of relations [12]. Therewith, the establishment of the system chronologically coincided with the development and implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy, of which the Eastern Partnership is a part, prompting a corresponding reaction to the invasions first in Crimea and Donbas and then a full-scale intervention in 2022, which can be called a particular kind of value solidarity.

The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), which is developing as a complementary structure of the EU, should be distinguished apart. Its leading purpose is to develop opportunities to further increase the European Union's mechanisms for the settlement of military conflicts or border defence specifically. The development of this defense structure resulted in the adoption of the EU Global Strategy in 2016 [6].

At the same time, the European community, based on the same fundamental principles of the European Security and Defence Policy, the EU Global Strategy and the mechanisms of cooperation between the Member States of the Union, has thought about the establishment of a “European army”. In 2017, during a meeting of EU defence heads in Tallinn, the Lithuanian delegation proposed the introduction of a so-called “military Schengen area” for the rapid movement of European Union forces and civilian response forces established under the ESDP programme across Europe [13]. In November of the same year, 23 countries of the Union signed the relevant notification on the coordination of the special program. The new program is called PESCO, which stands for “Permanent Structured Cooperation”. Proponents thought that the established cooperation of signatory countries will allow for savings in armaments development and thus redistribute objectives in such a way that each country has its military specialisation. In this framework, PESCO includes cooperation to develop new security and military capabilities by addressing the shortcomings of past programmes, thus clarifying that Structured Continuous Cooperation is not an alternative to NATO but is intended to improve cooperation among EU member states. The costs associated with the projects are covered, first of all, by the participating countries and then by the general EU budget. It allows for a gradual increase of defence budgets in real terms by about 20% and investing this profit in common defence capability projects [14].

The next step in strengthening the European Union's defence capabilities was the signing in 2018 of the Agreement on Civilian Missions of the SPSS (known as

the ESDP) – it was the conclusion of a two-year effort by a team of European diplomats, military, and analysts, and intended to strengthen the European Union's ability to deploy civilian crisis management missions, supporting the police, administration, etc. [3].

In 2021, the idea of European armed forces was supported by 14 EU countries (Germany and France, in particular), which proposed to establish a rapid reaction force with the possibility of their usage abroad. The primary purpose was to establish a “strategic autonomy” from NATO, in which the EU member states would consolidate their defence capabilities to use defence budgets more efficiently in times of financial constraints (crises). Such an essentially revolutionary proposal confirmed the tenets of the Lisbon Agreement (2007), which defined defence cooperation as the concept of “concentration and distribution”, providing all necessary defence capabilities to a member state that requires them without having them at its disposal [6].

Meanwhile, the Alliance itself was at the time implementing major processes to improve its defence capabilities, such as the development of new operational and tactical military command structures and the strengthening of bases in Eastern Europe, thus the European Union initiative was met with jealousy, assuring that such developments would never replace the North Atlantic Alliance format, and such initiatives could, on the contrary, weaken the ability of NATO's EU and non-Alliance allies to cooperate. Therefore, the European leadership was forced to partially listen to the opinion of its partners and to continue the parallel deepening of cooperation between these structures [3].

Nevertheless, the Alliance supported the European Union's aspirations to pursue an independent self-sufficient policy in the defence sphere, which provided the opportunity to develop its military measures. It is confirmed, in particular, by regular consultations of experts of both organisations to ensure access of EU working groups to the operational planning capabilities of the Alliance and adaptation of EU defence planning to these standards. In addition to this, NATO is developing some options for exclusive leadership of operations under the aegis of the EU. According to the Lisbon Treaty, the EU countries can decide for themselves how deeply they will integrate into the military sphere. Therewith, the treaty provides for the possibility of member states whose military potential is higher than the criteria and which are bound to each other by obligations to establish “permanent structured work” within the EU [15].

The latest available step towards autonomy from NATO is the “Strategic Compass”, adopted by the EU states in 2022. Due to it, the European Union is reconsidering the current approaches to the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy and seeks to strengthen the capabilities of this association in response to security challenges in Europe. Considering the current steps of

Ukraine towards its accession to the European Union, the “Strategic Compass” is the leading document, the provisions of which should be considered in the next stages of European integration [5].

Its regulatory framework describes Russia's war against Ukraine in general terms as an imminent change in Europe's history, prompting action by returning to power politics in a contradictory multipolar world that is gradually acquiring the tendencies of the bipolar confrontation of the second half of the twentieth century. In particular, considering the demand for increased mobility, robustness, and flexibility in crisis management operations, the EU plans to develop the rapid deployment capabilities of defence military entities (around five thousand troops, but other components of capabilities) over several years, for which the rapid reaction force battle groups will be modified by 2023 already. The existing EU missions will change their structure: it is planned to deploy about two hundred experts per month in such civilian missions [4]. Therewith, they plan to reform civilian and military command structures and improve existing conflict early warning capabilities in line with modern requirements in the extreme tensions of the European region.

The European collective leadership has decided to enhance capabilities and strength in the face of threats. For this purpose, the intelligence services of the European Union will consider all potential threats to the union, which will simplify the transfer of intelligence data within the Union. Separately, the document considers the plan of cooperation in the field of security and defence with the Union's partners, in particular with Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia on the eastern borders. The priority of such collaborative work of the European Union with these partners will be the response to hybrid threats, disinformation, and additionally – cybersecurity [16].

Thus, the above demonstrates that the emergence of a European security space in the form of a fully-fledged European Union army, the development and evolution of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), which includes the deployment of rapid reaction forces, and in the enhanced arrangements with the North Atlantic Alliance, which inherently encourage close cooperation in times of crisis, are coming to the surface. The Russian-Ukrainian war, in particular its phase of a full-scale Russian invasion from 24 February 2022, can in this respect be called a kind of “bifurcation point”, which a) demonstrated the potential threat to EU member states in Eastern Europe and b) demonstrated the irrelevance of previous European Union defence concepts to the challenges and threats of the present, c) established the necessity for a radical change both in its military orientation in strategic terms and its political vector to the aggressor state (Table 1).

**Table 1.** European Union anti-Russian sanctions after the start of a full-scale Russian invasion in 2022

Title	The bottom line
Sanctions against individuals and legal entities	The prohibition on providing funds, travel prohibition and assets freeze were imposed on 654 individuals and 52 legal entities
Financial sanctions	Complete freezing of assets and financial blocking of 3 leading Russian banks, prohibition of all types of lending to Russian banks

Table 1, Continued

Title	The bottom line
Energetic sanctions	Export of oil refining technologies is restricted
Transport sanctions	Export and sale of aircraft and aircraft equipment is restricted
Sanctions against high technologies	Restricted access to a number of high-tech developments, including drones and encryption devices
Visa sanctions	Visa-free regime for diplomats suspended

Source: [17]

### Discussion

The study proved that by identifying the main range of problematic political and other issues based on the available source base, their systematic analysis and synthesis, not only demonstrates the “blank spots” in the historiography and analytical literature but allows outlining the following list of problems:

1. Political component of strengthening the defense capabilities of the European Union in connection with the Russian-Ukrainian war.
2. Problems and perspectives of the European Union on the way to the development of defense mechanisms.
3. The influence of the EU ambitions on relations with NATO.

However, the Russian aggression against Ukraine has become a major challenge for the entire region of Central and Eastern Europe and has raised questions about how the countries can defend themselves against a possible Moscow invasion. Against this background, the issues of the Russian-Ukrainian war and the EU countries' security have become of equal significance. The system of bipolar world order has become a precarious target, as the European Union itself has recognised. The one logical solution was a return to the ideas of a “United Europe”, the format of which, for the reasons mentioned above, had significantly changed to include the countries of the Union itself and its potential partners. However, researchers M. Sini and N. Borrigan in their study “European Union Politics” emphasised that at the present stage of the EU functioning, there is a tendency to substitute the idea of “united Europe” for that of the Union itself, that is, to attempt to deactivate the concept of this union, the grounds of its existence and potential perspectives [6]. This, in particular, is the work of Eurosceptic politicians, who are somehow financed by the Russian Federation.

In contrast, S. Leonard and C. Kohnert, in their study “Refugees, Security, and the European Union”, among others, discussed the problems of strengthening the EU's position and defence capacity. Security and defence issues are prioritised, determining that the transformation of the Alliance into a cooperative defence organisation is motivated by a lack of confidence in the strength of the North Atlantic Alliance. Its desire to monopolise its influence on the territory of Europe in opposition to all initiatives of the European collective leadership is becoming, according to the authors, painful, while no major transformations have been noticed [3].

In addition, the available historiography notes that a definite advantage of the European Union in matters of domestic, foreign, security, and defence policy is its flexible distribution of competencies between the EU institutions

(in particular the military) and the national governments of the member states. According to researchers S. Paladini and I. Castellucci in their study “European security in a post-Brexit world”, this position is a type of impetus for a new transformation that will force the European collective leadership to design a different development strategy in consideration of the Union's new ambitions, resulting in its accomplishing its purposes and expanding its activities in the matter of its security and international cooperation [7]. The political willingness of the EU countries can establish a strong enough counterweight to the existing security concepts in the form of NATO. The problems of Russian neo-Soviet revanchism are mentioned by V. Vebl and Z. Sliva in their research. They emphasised that the latest threats to the EU by Russia in the form of territorial claims on the Soviet Union legacy, without exaggeration, question the legitimisation of the current socio-political paradigm and indicate a systemic crisis of both European and global defence policy in general [18].

The motivation to improve the security and defence capabilities, the course to reduce NATO's influence on the defence wing of the European Union, and the corresponding policy of a new perspective on security are discussed in the study by D. Fiott. The author emphasised that these factors encourage internal institutional developments of the organisation in the military field. Consequently, a system was established at the time to harmonise the EU's algorithm for warning against threats of conflict and to ensure the rapid anticipation and countering of military conflicts within the EU and in the states bordering it. Threat analysis through this system is performed several times a year (often twice) [19]. Such a scheme should provide up-to-date data on the probability of crisis phenomena in “experimental” countries of this system. It was the System that envisaged a military conflict in Ukraine, and its outcome prompted a measured EU response in the form of sanctions leverage on Russia, which temporarily curtailed its appetite, delaying a full-scale invasion for as long as eight years. Notably, before the introduction of this system, the European Union used expert assessments. Thus, the European Neighbourhood Policy has frequently been considered a mechanism for conflict assessment and prevention to establish an axis of countries with a low risk of military conflicts and social crises, developing according to European standards through support programmes [3].

To strengthen the borders, the European Neighbourhood Policy program was established as a response to the EU expansion. The multilateral dimension of the program operates at the following levels: summits with the participation of both EU member states and partner countries; bilateral meetings of foreign ministers. Its primary purpose is

to cooperate with the neighboring countries in the fields of trade, security, and defense with the further establishment of a wide area around the borders of the European Union, where peace, stability, and prosperity will be ensured due to the established long-term relations. As for political encouragement for partners who successfully manage to improve all standards declared by the Union, the opportunity to conclude broader bilateral agreements of a new generation is considered. They, however, are designed to become a significant tool for strengthening the security area. Financial support, which is provided by the partnership policy, is considered an incentive for partners to fulfill all requirements. A number of these financial and economic aspects of the EU policy are mentioned in the study by T. Formanek [12].

The program itself does not guarantee accession to the EU for partner countries, but promoting economic and political reforms, supporting closer economic integration, sustainable development, and political leadership of the partner is an option to prevent military threats and expel unreliable parties to the initiative. However, this demonstrated a willingness on the part of the European collective leadership to defend its interests at the borders [10].

Subsequently, the above-mentioned resulted in the revision of the main principles of the European Security and Defense Policy, defining as a priority the desire for “structural and strategic autonomy” from transatlantic defense establishments (in this case – NATO). T. Sale noted that these trends resulted in the adoption of the EU Global Strategy, which recognized that the autonomy of the association is essential for the implementation of the defense and security plan [7]. It required member states to “unite their borders” (again, a curtsey towards the ideas of a “United Europe”) and to implement a consistent use of all – from preventive to proximate – means to defend their interests, including through swift decisions at local, national, regional and global levels. In addition, according to this strategy, the EU strives to establish a new international order based on its principles of sustainable development.

The effects of the EU Global Strategy were visible a year later, in 2017 when another qualitative improvement in the Union's security and defense sector was the introduction of PESCO (Permanent Structured Cooperation), which provides a new framework for EU countries to implement ambitious defense projects. The leadership of the European Union pursues the purpose of accumulating a specific part of defense expenditures to use them more efficiently [7].

Another significant stage in improving the management of the security environment, and at the same time affirming the European Union's position, has been the reformatting of the civilian mission procedure, which includes the significance of rethinking EU member states' engagement strategy in conflict resolution missions and an orientation towards expanding the security space.

The EU countries do not abandon the idea of full autonomy from the Alliance. Although NATO is assisting in the expansion of the defense area through the “European security format”, its leaders declare that this format will never substitute the North Atlantic Alliance. However, researcher A. Boven, examining the issue in his research in the context of EU and Russian diplomatic policy towards Donbas, noted that against the background of

Russian aggression in Ukraine, the European community has decided to follow its priorities, which gradually pushes the way to a new establishment – the European Defense Forces. For this purpose, the EU has selected a new area of work: reforming the ESDP and implementing its qualitative potential, which in turn highlights the dialogue that would help achieve security policy agreements among member states, review and establish new crisis management and strengthen the capabilities of the defense industry [20]. Accordingly, this defense policy has a straightforward impact on the redefinition of military concepts in both Ukraine and Russia, ranging from financing and industrial provisioning to the motivational component of a soldier training, both conscripts, and cadres [21].

Thus, it must be stated that the European Union's resources in the context of prospects for strengthening its defence capacity cover the military and diplomatic fields. At the same time, the Russian-Ukrainian war since 2014 and its full-scale phase from 2022 demonstrate both the general necessity to reset the European Union's defence policy and the necessity to thoroughly analyse all areas of potential pressure.

## Conclusions

During the Russian-Ukrainian war, the idea of a “united Europe” as a system-forming concept started to gain popularity in the European Union, with the Russian invasion on 24 February 2022 being the high point of understanding on the matter. At the same time, the crisis phenomena against the background of military intervention raised the question of the very “form” of such a concept and provoked an open dialogue.

The development of the European Union into a collective defence organisation is logical, as some members of the European leaders lack confidence in the strength of the Alliance at this stage. Its desire to monopolise its influence on the territory of Europe as opposed to all initiatives is becoming painful, while no major changes have been noticed.

Therefore, the improvement in European defence cooperation – is the emergence of new security programs, such as the European Partnership Policy, PESCO, or Strategic Compass, which, in particular, are generally accepted instruments for the protection of Europe and its values.

Therewith, the adoption of the EU Global Strategy has set the purpose for the EU Member States to “unite their borders” and to implement consistent use of all – from preventive to immediate – means of defending their interests both on the territory of the Union and beyond its borders.

The escalation of the Russian-Ukrainian war in the form of a full-scale invasion has actualised the EU's requirement for increased military mobility and the emergence of a “defence force”, which makes autonomy from NATO considered a natural occurrence. Therefore, the European security space in the form of a full-fledged army of the European Union can be considered a matter of time. Currently, the main question in the establishment of a European army is whether all EU members will agree to transfer to official Brussels the authority to use their troops. In addition, it should not be forgotten that for several European countries, the army has been an important symbol of national sovereignty for many years.

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**Посилення обороноздатності країн ЄС  
в умовах російсько-української війни**

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**Анотація.** Проблематика статті проливає світло на військово-політичний вимір діяльності Європейського Союзу та його перспектив у перетворенні на об'єднання колективної безпеки у рамках російсько-української війни. Ця тема потрапляла у фокус дослідників, проте, розглядалася ними в контексті історії Європейського Союзу і не передбачала власне окремого дослідження. Мета цього дослідження – розгляд градації обороноздатності Європейського Союзу в період із початку російсько-української війни (2014) до моменту повномасштабного вторгнення РФ в Україну (2022) та перспективи подальшого розвитку цієї сфери в межах ЄС. Основа методологічної бази дослідження полягає у поєднанні загальноісторичних та політологічних методів, серед яких провідне місце займають ретроспективний та інституціональний. Власне аналітична робота з матеріалами, виокремлення певних робіт для кожного із завдань супроводжувалися використанням критико-діалектичного, історико-системного, дійового та проблемно-хронологічного методів. У результаті дослідження було виявлено, що військова складова обороноздатності Євросоюзу полягає у перегляді та розбудові Європейської політики безпеки і оборони (ЄПБО), створенні нових оборонних програм (PESCO), «програм лояльності» (Європейська політика партнерства) та інших можливих структур задля появи великого безпекового простору на кордонах із Росією та її сателітами. Практична цінність праці виявлена у можливості використання зазначених фактів у подальшому вивченні теми розвитку оборонної сфери Євросоюзу у XXI ст., а також проблематики наднаціональних безпекових утворень, зокрема на теренах Європи

**Ключові слова:** Європейський Союз, політика партнерства, НАТО, Глобальна стратегія, Європейська політика безпеки і оборони